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Chapter I
SUMMARY OF WORK, INTRODUCTION, OBJECTIVES,
AND OVERVIEW OF TIlESIS
Summary ofWork
A simulation analysis identifies optimal wheat grading and pricing strategies for
country elevators under three possible competitive structures. The three competitive
structures are: I) an elevator is a perfect monopsony, with no competition in its potential
trade area~ 2) an elevator has competitors that do not follow its lead in formulating a
grading and pricing strategy~ and 3) an elevator has competitors that copy its
grading/pricing strategy. For each structure, an elevator and its competitors consider three
possible grading and pricing strategies: 1) an elevator grades and segregates the wheat
delivered, and also pays producers prices that differ according to the quality of wheat they
deliver~ 2) an elevator grades the wheat received and segregates it to receive prices from
next-in-line (Nll.) buyers that are adjusted for quality, but pays producers one price for all
qualities ofwheat~ and 3) an elevator does not grade the wheat received, nor does it
segregate the wheat into different qualities or pay different prices to producers for
different qualities.
A sensitivity analysis identifies the optimal strategies over a range of reasonably
likely operating environments, consistent with the range of conditions observed during the
1995, 1996, and 1997 harvests.
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The results show that country elevators facing no competition or competitors who
did not copy should have graded and segregated, and paid producers different prices for
different qualities on the basis oftest weight and dockage for the 1995, 1996, and 1997
wheat harvests. The price differentials were large enough for elevators to profit by passing
on to producers 70 % ofthe differential received from Nll.. buyers. However, the price
differentials were not large enough for shrunken and broken kernels (SBK). Therefore,
country elevators would not have profited by grading and segregating, and paying
producers different quality prices on the basis of SBK. There were low percentages of
SBK for the 1995, 1996, and 1997 harvests.
However, for elevators with competitors that copy their grading/pricing strategies,
grading and paying producers different prices for different qualities would neither increase
nor decrease profits compared to not grading. However, if the elevators chose to grade.,
and pay quality-related prices, they would pass on most or all of the price differential
received from Nll.. buyers. This could potentially raise the quality oru.s. wheat.
The results from the simulation and sensitivity analysis showed that a country
elevator can profit from paying producers quality-related prices if price differentials
received from Nll.. buyers are greater than two cents per bushel. Since Nil.. buyers have
begun to charge .larger discounts for specific quality characteristics, the price differentials
are usually greater than two cents for the most important quality characteristics.
Therefore, early adopters can be expected to pass on 70010 of price differentials. The
results show that the higher the price differential from NIL buyers, the higher the profits
can be made by an elevator that grades correctly and passes on the price differential to
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producers, if its competitors do not follow suit.
However, ifcompetitors follow suit. there is no increase in profits by grading and
segregating the wheat received, and paying producers different prices for different
qualities. However, producers of high and middle quality wheat benefit from higher prices,
while producers oflow quality receive a lower price. To the extent producers can control
wheat quality, this would increase the overall quality of wheat entering the marketing
system. The results changed little when varying the overall production density and the
quality proportions in an elevator's trade area.
The results are consistent with Hill's (1988) assertion that market prices should
convey information about the quality of the grains and should provide incentives for
improving quality. Hill argues that grain quality would be improved ifparticipants were
rewarded for improving quality and value. Producers could improve quality of wheat they
deliver through weed control, time of sowing, wheat variety, and tillage methods. By
eliminating incentives for diminishing value, quality-adjusted prices would increase the
overall quality ofD.S. wheat. This could increase the U.S. market share ofworld wheat
exports because of increased demand by importing countries..
This research is important to the whole wheat industry of the United States.
Kenkel, Anderson, and Attaway found that country elevators in Oklahoma were not
grading and pricing wheat based on quality. Producers supplying high quality wheat were
not being rewarded.
The results here show that an early adopter of the practice of grading and paying
different prices to producers can increase profit significantly by increasing its trade area
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for high quality wheat. As other country elevators adopt the practice. producers would
have increased incentives to improve the quality ofwheat.
Ifcountry elevators don't begin grading and paying prices based on quality, it
could be hannful for the U.S. wheat industry. This is because countries with the reputation
of high quality wheat such as Canada and Australia will continue to increase their share of
world wheat exports while U.S. market share continues to decrease. As Johnson and King
note, most of the grain in traditional market channels passes through country elevators. so
prices set by country elevators for wheat ofvarious qualities provide important signals
from world markets to producers. Also. as consumers increasingly demand differentiated
products, a market pricing system that does not adequately reward quality may lead to
increased alliances and vertical integration. These may introduce inefficiencies of their
own. Therefore. this author recommends to the USDA and Federal Grain Inspection
Service that it consider ways to encourage elevators to grade correctly and pass on to
producers quality-related price differentials received from Nll- buyers. Such action should
increase overall quality ofU.S. wheat. and might remove part of the incentive for
increased contracting and vertical integration in the industry.
In the long run, profits would not be increased by elevators for doing this, nor
would they be reduced. If this is done, it would adequately transmit correct price signals
to producers and this would give them incentives to improve the quality.
Introduction
The grain grading system has provided little incentive to country elevators to
provide premiums for producers with high quality grain and charge discounts for lower
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-quality grain. For various reasons, elevators typically have penalized producers and firms
who deliver grain ofa quality below some standard quality level, often the level that
separates one Federal Grain Inspection Service (FGIS)-defined grade from another, but
have failed to reward producers who deliver higher-quality grain. In the last two or three
years, though, next-in-line (Nll..) buyers have begun to charge larger discounts for specific
quality characteristics (Kenkel, Anderson, and Attaway). To some extent, better grain
testing technology has facilitated this. In effect, the marketing system has begun to impose
its own system of grades and standards.
Elevators now must decide to what extent they will impose these more rigorous
standards on producers. Measuring quality characteristics more precisely will cost more,
but will reward elevators that use the information to increase price received from next-in-
line (NIL) buyers and facilitate supplying products that meet consumers' needs.
However, an elevator that imposes discounts for lower quality wheat, even while
paying a higher price for high quality wheat, risks losing business iffarmers believe that
competing elevator is more likely to pay them a higher price net of discounts. To the
extent that maintaining volume is important to an elevator's profits, elevators may lose
money by grading correctly and passing on premiums and discounts. They may use lenient
grading as a form of nonprice competition. On the other hand, firms with more market
power may have greater ability to impose discounts (Hall and Rosenfeld). Kenkel,
Anderson, and Attaway found that grade information on scale tickets by Oklahoma
elevators tended to overestimate test weight and underestimate dockage and undesirable
grade factors, such as damaged kernels, shrunken and broken kernels, and foreign material
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-for hard red winter wheat in the 1995 and 1996 harvests. The authors suggested that
elevators were losing up to 9.32 cents per bushel for the 1995 harvest and 3.75 cents per
bushel for the 1996 harvest by not grading correctly. This reflects an apparent pricing
inefficiency in the Oklahoma wheat market in that elevators paid more than they should
have for low quality wheat and less than they should have for high quality wheat. The
study also found that elevator grading practices were providing imperfect incentives for
producers to deliver high quality grain, since current practices tended to disproportionally
benefit producers with the lowest quality grain. Also, they may have received less from
NIL buyers than they could have. This is because an elevator that grades and prices wheat
incorrectly does not know the quality ofgrain it has, so it cannot blend and segregate in
the best way to receive the highest price from~ buyers.
Similar inefficiencies may have contributed to increased vertical integration in the
pork market; the marketing system wasn't adequately transmitting price signals for quality
characteristics. Moves toward value-based marketing have enhanced the industry's ability
to satisfy the consumer and increase the competitiveness of the pork sector (Brorsen). For
the same reason, the beefindustry is considering moving to a value-based marketing
system. Feuz, Fausti, and Wagner have found that the beef market is not effectively
communicating the desires of the consumer to the producer.
Grain elevators are interested in maintaining adequate margins on the volume of
grain they receive and maximizing the use oftheir fixed assets. To do this, they must pay
prices that encourage producers to supply high quality grain, but that are also high enough
for average quality grain to maintain an economically efficient volume ofgrain. Strict and
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baccurate grading will maximize an elevator's margin on each bushel handled; the elevator
can pass on to the producer the discounts imposed by the~ buyer, and can use
appropriate segregating and blending strategies to minimize the discounts it receives.
However, more lenient grading may help an elevator maintain an economically efficient
volume ofgrain. Therefore, Kenkel, Anderson, and Attaway may be incorrect in that
elevators are losing money by not grading correctly. This is because stricter grading may
not maintain an economically efficient volume ofgrain for an elevator. This means
Oklahoma elevators may be passing the correct prices on to producers due to spatial
competition. This paper attempts to determine ifgrading accurately increases the profits of
an elevator.
The research here attempts to describe how the presence and nature ofcompetition
among elevators in sourcing grain may influence an elevator's behavior in passing on or
absorbing quality discounts. It attempts to explain why elevators use grading practices that
appear to overvalue low-quality grain and undervalue high-quality grain. Several factors
may help explain current practices, including the additional costs ofgrading (time, labor,
and equipment), the effect of space and distance on the difference between an elevator's
bid price and the price at the farm net of transportation cost, competitive pressures faced
by elevators, and elevator's use ofgrading practices as a form of nonprice competition
where elevators may be consciously over-estimating grain quality in an attempt to gain
market share. Other explanations include a "prospect theory" hypothesis that producers
dislike discounts more than they like premiums of the same magnitude (Benartzi and
Thaler), and risk averse behavior by producers who are uncertain about the quality of their
7
-grain and the grade their grain will be assigned. These explanations recognize that
discounting by elevators may cause them to lose profitable business from producers
concerned about receiving discounted prices for grain.
This research concentrates on the effect of transportation cost and space and
competitive pressures faced by elevators. Transportation cost affects the price an elevator
must pay to attract grain of various quality characteristics from various distances across its
trade area. To the extent that space and transportation cost separate an elevator from
competitors, it possesses monopsony power, and may be able to attract high quality grain
without paying a substantially higher price for it. Conversely, increased competition
among country elevators may limit an elevator's ability to pay different prices for wheat of
different quality characteristics.
Grain elevators are interested in meeting buyer demands as efficiently as possible.
Therefore, an elevator needs to know the optimal prices that must be offered to producers
for wheat of different quality levels to profit from grading correctly and passing on the
differential payments on the basis of quality for wheat.
Objectives
The general objective of this research is to increase the pricing efficiency of
country elevators' pricing practices for wheat in the Oklahoma market.
The specific objectives are as follows:
(1) Determine a local elevator's optimal grading and pricing strategies, given
prices offered by Nil., buyers for different quality levels ofwheat.
(2) Determine the effect of space and competition on the results of objective I.
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Overview of Thesis
A simulation analysis is used to determine the extent to which a country elevator
will pass on to producers premiums and discounts it receives from next-in-line buyers.
Simulations are run over a range of parameter values that reflect an elevator's potential
operating environment. For each set of parameters, the choice variables (price(s) paid to
producers for hard red winter wheat of different qualities) that maximize profit for an
elevator are selected. A sensitivity analysis is conducted, varying the production densities,
the proportion ofeach quality ofwheat available in the elevator's trade area, and price
differentials paid by Nll.. buyers. The simulation determines the optimal prices that an
elevator should pass on to producers. Several scenarios for type of competition faced by
an elevator are considered to determine how competitive pressures affect prices that
should be paid to producers.
The following is a brief overview of subsequent chapters. Chapter 2, a review of
literature, demonstrates the concern with grain grading accuracy that the industry and
academic observers have shown historically, and that it has become more important as
next-in-line buyers have begun to charge more substantial discounts for wheat with less
desirable characteristics. The review also discusses costs and benefits of several different
ways to improve the quality ofwheat.
Chapter 3 describes a profit-maximizing model for an elevator. The model solves
simultaneously for an elevator's trade area and prices paid to producers, that are a
function of price paid to producers by competing elevators, transportation cost, and
density ofwheat production in the elevator's potential trade area.
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Chapter 4 describes the procedures used in the simulation. It describes the
scenarios over which elevator's grading and pricing decisions are simulated. A range of
parameters that reflects elevator operating and competitive environments is considered.
The range of parameters chosen reflects the range ofconditions observed in the 1995,
1996, and 1997 harvests as well as the 1990 market environment for comparison. A
sensitivity analysis varies overall wheat production densities, prices paid by Nll., buyers for
different qualities, and production densities ofdifferent qualities ofwheat. For each
scenario, a profit-maximizing algorithm in the simulation solves for the optimal prices that
should be offered by elevators to producers.
Three years ofharvest time grain quality data for the 1995, 1996, and 1997
harvests collected by Kenkel, Anderson, and Attaway from Oklahoma country elevators
are used to determine the percentages of the various qualities of hard red winter wheat
that is present throughout Oklahoma for the different harvest years. These data provide
official measurements of several hard red winter wheat quality characteristics, and are
used to estimate the distributions of the quality levels for 1995, 1996, and 1997 harvest
years. Nil.. buyer discount schedules provide discounts that were passed on to country
elevators for each quality level for the 1995, 1996, and 1997 harvests. These data are used
to compare to the results of the simulation and sensitivity analysis to determine how
country elevators should have graded and priced wheat for the 1995, 1996, and 1997
harvests.
Chapter 5 presents the results of the simulation, identifying optimal grading and
pricing strategies for each operating environment. Chapter 6 summarizes the results of the
10
simulation and sensitivity analysis and discusses the conclusions that have been made from
this study. It then suggest ways to extend and improve upon this research.
11
Chapter II
LITERATURE REVIEW
Introduction
The purpose of this review is to point out the importance ofgrain grading
accuracy and how it affects the price and quality relationship of grains in the United
States. It begins by reviewing the history of grain grading practices. Then, it describes the
relationship between grain price and quality, as well as activities such as segregation and
blending that elevators can use to achieve specific quality levels. Next, it looks at the
factors affecting the number, location, and the grading and pricing strategies ofa country
elevator. Finally, the review examines current grading and pricing practices at country
elevators.
History of Grain Grading Practices
The search for unifonn measures ofquality of grain grading standards is very
important in establishing standards to reward quality. Hill (1990) states that the debate,
and proposals for legislation, indicate that the search for defining grades to show unifonn
measures of quality wi)) continue for as long as grain is bought and sold.
Hill (1988) notes that the U.S. market share ofgrains has decreased in the export
market. For more than a century, foreign buyers have been complaining how poor U. S.
wheat is compared to Canadian and Australian wheat. Adam, Kenkel, and Anderson
12
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-observe that in hopes ofenhancing the reputation ofthe U.S. as a supplier ofquality grain
in world markets, numerous proposals have called for changes in the U.S. grain marketing
system. Hill (1988) suggests that grades with market prices should convey information
about the quality of the grains and should provide incentives for improving quality.
However, current grades fail to do this. Hill (1988) suggests two approaches to solve
grain quality problems: (1) prohibit practices that are considered detrimental to quality
such as adulteration and (2) change grades and pricing strategies so that participants are
rewarded for improving quality and value. Ifthese are done, he argues, the market should
provide premiums for higher quality wheat and eliminate incentives for diminishing value.
This means grades should be based on economic values, and should provide incentives for
better quality.
Price-Ouality Relationship for Grain
In the last two or three years, domestic and international markets have began to
tighten grain quality requirements and the marketing system has begun to impose its own
system of grades and standards. Country elevators must now decide the extent to which
they should impose these tighter standards on producers, offering premiums and charging
discounts for various qualities of wheat. Hall and Rosenfeld formulated a theoretical
model specifying quality characteristics for grain as a function ofvarious economic
elements. The economic relevance of quality factors in proper grading techniques can be
assessed by determining the extent to which elevators' discount schedules are explained by
these economic elements. Hall and Rosenfeld used an empirical model, the results of
which indicated that damage and foreign matter were economically important quality
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factors that warranted discount pricing. However, test weight was not an economically
significant factor for quality discounts for com. Accordingly, Hill (1990) suggested that
test weight should be considered for elimination from the United States official set ofgrain
grades and standards for com because there is no relationship between test weight and
nutritional and protein values in corn. However, test weight may be more important.
Flagg states that for wheat, flour milling yield is one of three important factors considered
when buying wheat, and that test weight is strongly correlated with milling yield.
Also, dockage in the U.S. marketing system is a nongrade-determining factor but
other countries include dockage as a grade-detennining factor with many limits. Canadian
and Australian regulations guarantee minimum dockage levels in exports, and these are
uniform for all importing countries. This may be one reason Canada and Australia have
increased their market share in the world wheat market. Since dockage in the U.S. is not a
grade detennining factor, competitive pressures and grain cleaning serve as the regulatory
mechanism (Wilson, Scherping, Johnson, and Cobia). Brennan states that the Australian
Wheat Board believes there are two reasons for implementing differential payments on the
basis of quality. The first reason is to redistribute current payments to the producers
whose wheat contributes most of the value to the overall profits of an elevator. The
second reason is to provide an incentive for farmers to improve the quality of wheat
delivered. Brennan states that incentives need to be adequate to revoke a response by
farmers to improve the quality ofAustralian wheat. If there is not enough incentive, then
quality will not be improved.
Wilson notes that price differentiation in the world wheat market has increased in
14
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the last 15 years. He finds that there is an implicit market for quality characteristics in
export wheat. Therefore, as price differentials increase, the importance ofdifferentiating
increases. This implies that accurately grading grains will become important to country
elevators and their profits. It also has important implications for competitive strategies
among competing elevators.
Barkely and Porter discuss choices ofwheat variety by Kansas producers during
1974 to 1993. The decisions were statistically associated with production characteristics
and end-use qualities. The results provide evidence that producers are interested in end-
use value characteristics, but economic considerations lead producers to plant varieties
with high yields but low milling and baking qualities. Producers have few incentives to
plant new varieties of wheat with high end-use milling and baking qualities.
Hill, Brophy, Zhang, and Florkowski conducted a questionnaire sent to com and
soybean farmers in Illinois, Iowa, and Indiana to detennine farmers' attitudes toward
discounts and premiums implemented by country elevators for different qualities of grain.
One question asked was if they would like to eliminate all discounts and premiums for
quality except for moisture, and receive one average price for grain regardless of quality,
even if few grain buyers pay premiums for high quality com. A response to eliminate
discounts could be a way for farmers to increase their net price. They surprisingly found
that 61.4% of Illinois farmers, 68.3% ofIowa farmers, and 55.8 % ofIndiana farmers said
they did not favor the elimination of quality discounts and premiums for com and
soybeans. Thus, a majority of these favored use of correct price differentials to help
improve the quality ofgrains.
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Hill, Brophy, and Florkowski estimated a supply function based on a farm survey
to determine responses to price premiums on higher quality com achieved by using low-
temperature drying methods. Their research showed that farmers are willing to make
investments to improve com quality even though it may require several years to recover
the investment costs. Also, the results of their model indicated that farmers will shift to
low-temperature drying on com at premiums as low as one cent per bushel. This suggests
that fanners are likely to respond to premiums in a positive manner.
Research to improve wheat quality can help increase profits at a country elevator.
Voon and Edwards evaluate the size and distribution ofthe economic benefits from
research that increases the protein content in Australian wheat. They estimated that
Australia has the potential to obtain net benefits ofup to $53 million per year from a one
percentage point increase in protein content in wheat. The most interesting result was that
90% of the gains accrue to wheat producers. Barkely and Porter state that research
developing new varieties of wheat will achieve higher end-use qualities as well as high
yields per acre. However, the creation of new varieties is estimated to require fifteen years
which means other actions must be done to improve current quality ofwheat.
Activities Improving the Quality of Grain at Country Elevators
Mechanically cleaning wheat can also improve quality. Cost of cleaning is an
important factor in an elevator's choice to improve quality. A country elevator might want
to provide premium incentives to farmers for cleaner wheat to try to eliminate costs of
cleaning wheat, and to help improve blending and segregating activities by the elevator.
Adam, Kenkel, and Anderson estimated the costs and benefits of cleaning export wheat at
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country elevators, subtenninal elevators, and port elevators. The net cost of cleaning
ranged from .5 cents to 2.0 cents per bushel, depending on wheat value, quality
characteristics and cleaning location, with a nationwide average of 1.0 cent per bushel.
These authors found that the largest cost ofcleaning wheat is the value of wheat and other
material lost in cleaning which averages 2.4 cents per bushel. However, although
premiums for low dockage wheat were not generally available at the time of their study,
elevators that are able to negotiate premiums would have found it profitable to clean
wheat.
Johnson and Wilson use a mathematical programming model to analyze cleaning
decisions at country elevators in the United States. They compared the years 1987 and
1990, where 1987 was characterized by a crop with high dockage and low screening
values, while the 1990 crop was more normal. They found that screening value and
transportation cost had the most influence on cleaning decisions. Screening values greater
than $20 to $25 per ton induced cleaning. Also in 1987, cleaning for long hauls was more
profitable with transportation costs in excess of$.90 per bushel. The authors found that in
the 1987 harvest year, a minimum discount of $.50 per bushel was necessary to induce
cleaning down to .5% dockage. For 1990, no discount was necessary because other
factors, such as transportation cost around $.50 per bushel, provided sufficient incentive
to induce cleaning. The authors conclude that, although they were not petvasive in
current trading practices, discounts for excess dockage can induce cleaning to satisfy the
demands ofnext-in-line buyers.
Lin and Leath, summarizing several studies, concluded during the early 1990's that
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-cleaning all U.S. export wheat would not be economically feasible. They suggest that the
costs could exceed benefits by $8 million doUars ifall wheat is cleaned. Therefore. they
suggest that the best strategy is only to target countries that are willing to pay a premium
for cleaner wheat. Lin and Leath state that if the U.S. were to target niche markets, it
could gain $8 to $10 million in net benefits. Domestic benefits occur in the fonn of lower
handling, storage, and transportation costs, and revenue from sales of screenings.
International benefits stem from any premiums foreign buyers are willing to pay for cleaner
wheat and from increases in U.S. wheat exports. In conclusion, cleaning wheat can be very
expensive unless it is managed to clean wheat only for those markets that offer premiums
for cleaner wheat. Therefore, correct grading procedures will be required to keep track of
different qualities of wheat to be cleaned. To reduce cleaning cost, premiums offered to
farmers to produce better quality wheat could reduce costs of cleaning because of the
increased supply ofbetter quality wheat.
Strategies such as segregation and blending can be used to increase the quality of
wheat. Kenkel, Anderson and Attaway used a linear programming model to determine the
most profitable segregation strategy for an elevator in the 1995 and 1996 wheat harvests
in Oklahoma. The model assumed that the elevator had the ability to segregate wheat into
three different bins as it was received. The quality ofwheat in each bin was determined by
the segregation strategy. These strategies included segregating by moisture, test weight,
dockage, and grade. The model then selected blending and cleaning activities to maximize
profits. For the 1995 harvest, segregation activities helped elevators with cleaning
equipment increase their profits by 2.2 to 3.0 cents per bushel. The 1995 harvest year was
18
II
I::
· ,
'"
'.,
· :
'I
· f
a higher dockage year, with the wheat containing an average of about 3.85% dockage. For
the 1996 harvest, segregating, blending, and cleaning strategies had little impact on
elevator profits. The 1996 harvest year was a low dockage year, averaging about .97%
dockage.
Hill (1988) notes that blending provides country elevators a source ofincome. This
is because grain with higher moisture, foreign material, and damaged kernels will achieve a
higher price if it can be blended with higher quality grain. For example, lower quality com
with 5% foreign material can be blended with 1% foreign material to achieve 3% foreign
material which is the maximum allowed for No.2 com at a base price. This means the
better quality corn can be used to make poorer quality com a better value (Hill 1988). Hill
also states that economic incentives for blending exists for all grade factors.
Wrigley notes the best post-harvest strategy for ensuring grain of appropriate
quality that is provided to the market is to correctly test for quality after harvest when the
grain is delivered to the elevator. Also, segregate grain of different quality types into
different bins and pay producers according to the respective market values. Wrigley states
that this system has worked in Australia for many decades. The limitations for this strategy
is quality testing must be fast and the extra cost of testing and of separate storage and
transportation cost must be low enough to be justified by the increase in market value.
Factors Affecting a Country Elevator's Grading and Pricing Practices
Oppen and Hill discuss the differences in the number ofsize of country grain
elevators among the various geographical regions in Illinois. The authors tried to gain an
understanding of the factors influencing the size and number of elevators for use in
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predicting the future structure of the industry. They used a transportation model and
assumed that storage costs increase at a linear rate and that transportation rates($/bulmi)
from the fann to the elevator decrease with disclosure at a decreasing rate. The model
assumed that country elevators are of equal size. The expected increases in com
production and in the quantity of corn moved off-farm at harvest would cause elevators to
grow in number if marginal storage capacity and marginal transportation cost stayed the
same. Oppen and Hill found that since marginal capacity is likely to go up and marginal
transportation costs are likely to go down. a decrease in the number of country elevators is
likely. The model predicted a decrease in the number ofelevators from 1,430 in 1967 to
692 in 1975, and an increase in the average capacity from 250 to 660 thousand bushels.
Oppen and Hill fail to recognize other factors that might influence the location and number
of elevators in Dlinois, such as competition between elevators in the same region.
There are many factors that might influence a country elevator's grading and
pricing strategies in passing premiums/discounts on to producers. Hall and Rosenfeld
found that traditional arrangements may allow larger capacity elevators to pass on higher
discounts to the extent they think the market wi]] handle. This is because farmer
relationships with smaller elevators tend to be on a more personalized basis and less on an
economic standpoint, and these smaller elevators rely on local farmers for grain supplies.
The larger elevators can extend their buying reach across a number of producing and
trading areas. Hall and Rosenfeld's research found that the greater the market share ofa
single elevator, the higher its grain quality discounts. Therefore, an elevator's market
power may have a large effect on its pricing and grading strategies.
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Davis and Hill analyzed spatial price differentials for com among Dlinois country
elevators. They looked at causes of price variability that can be attributed to differences in
availability and cost of transportation, operating costs, local demand and supply
conditions, and market power. Differences in transportation cost, operating cost, and
supply and demand all have an economic reason for differences in price. Differences in
market power, however result in a market imperfection. A geographical monopsony exists
among country elevators because of spatial distances from the producer to an elevator and
competing elevators, which influence opportunity costs and actual costs of shipping grain
to elevators. Davis and Hill found that transportation costs, access to distant markets
through rail and water, and the supply of com available or purchased all affect the price
variability among elevators. However, these variables are outside the control of the
individual elevator. They found that a country elevator has a geographical monopsony
where it can use cost as a basis for setting price: it's a market with many competing finns
in a structure of monopsonistic competition as well as seasonally induced spatial
monopsony. This means that a country elevator has little control over variability of prices
among its competition except through its monopsony power due to spatial distance among
competing elevators.
Thompson and Dziura analyzed a study ofmerchandising margins in 1982 and
1983 at different locations of grain elevators in Illinois. A merchandising margin is the
difference between prices paid to producers and price received from next-in-line buyers.
They ran a regression analysis to determine what factors such as storage capacity, number
of competing elevators, and the area of an elevator's supply that might affect the
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merchandising margins for a country elevator. Thompson and Dziura found that there is an
inverse relationship between the merchandising margin and the radius of the firm's supply,
capacity utilization, and the scale ofoperation. Also, a negative relationship was found
between merchandising margins and number ofcompeting country elevators. This means
that more competitors surrounding a country elevator imply that the country elevator will
receive smaller merchandising margins.
Grain Grading Accuracy
Grain grading accuracy is very important in determining the appropriate grades
assigned to grains. Kenkel, Anderson, and Attaway have found that Oklahoma elevators
tend to grade inaccurately, costing a typical elevator more than 9.32 cents per bushel in
the 1995 harvest year and 3.75 cents per bushel in the 1996 harvest year. These authors
collected harvest-time quality data from Oklahoma country elevators in 1995 ,1996, and
1997. Their project was based on over 3,900 tail-gate truck samples at 43 elevators
throughout the Oklahoma wheat production areas. They are currently working on the data
for the 1997 harvest. They selected sampling sites to represent all major wheat producing
areas, and to include elevators with trade territories that extended into Texas and Kansas.
Their samples were obtained using truck (tailgate) sampling procedures recommended by
the Federal Grain Inspection Service (FGIS). Kenkel, Anderson, and Attaway collected
four to six-samples from each truck by pulling the truck sampling container in random
interval through the entire falling grain stream in a continuous motion. The four to six sub-
samples were then combined to provide a 1,200 to 1,500 gram sample for each truck.
Each sample was identified by an elevator scale ticket number and stored in a sealed
22
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container. These data were then officially graded by the Enid FGIS and compared to
country elevator grades. Complete scale ticket data were obtained for each sample,
including net weight, moisture, dockage, test weight, grade and other grade factors such
as shrunken and broken kernels, foreign material, and total defects. The elevators tended
to overestimate test weight and underestimate dockage and other undesirable grade
factors such as damaged kernels, and shrunken and broken kernels. The inaccuracy results
in a higher grade assigned to the grain than should be assigned.
The major portion of the loss to elevators in both years resulted from
underestimating dockage in wheat. Kenkel, Anderson, and Attaway state that
underestimating dockage has two impacts on the country elevator. This is because
tenninal elevators remove dockage from weight and they impose price discounts for
dockage levels above specified levels. Therefore, a country elevator who underestimates
dockage pays wheat price for material that is removed from weight by the tenninal
elevator and an elevator ends up paying cleaning fees or losing some of their margin in
excess of the price discounts it originally charged to the producer.
Kenkel, Anderson, and Attaway considered three different methods to help
improve grading. They measured the benefits using automated probes versus hand probes
and from mechanical dockage testers versus hand pan sieves in grading accurately, as well
as the importance ofeach step in the grading process. They found that the use of
mechanical dockage testers improved the accuracy ofdockage estimates from country
elevators. Specifically, they found that elevators with dockage machines were less likely to
underestimate dockage. In the 1995 harvest, elevators using hand pan sieves
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-underestimated the true dockage level by twice as much as those using mechanical
dockage testers and elevators using hand probes versus automatic probes found no
significant difference in dockage estimation. In the 1996 harvest, elevators with
mechanical dockage testers had a third less error in estimating dockage than elevators
using hand sieves. There was little difference in accuracy of dockage estimation in either
year between elevators using automated probes and those using hand probes, although in
1996 the error was slightly higher for automated probes. Kenkel, Anderson, and Attaway
also measured the importance ofeach grading step. The three most important steps were
the determination of dockage, test weight, and shrunken and broken kernels. Checking for
dockage was the most important because it would have benefited the elevator almost 25
cents per bushel in 1995 and over 5 cents per bushel during the low dockage 1996 harvest.
They found that checking for test weight was worth about 16 cents per bushel to elevators
in 1995 and over 9 cents per bushel in 1996. Checking for shrunken and broken kernels
would have benefited an elevator 0.9 cents per bushel in 1995 and around a third of a cent
per bushel in 1996. Therefore, using mechanical dockage testers and recognizing the
importance ofeach grading step can significantly increase an elevator's returns.
The results by Kenkel, Anderson, and Attaway suggest that inaccurate grading
elevators tend to benefit producers delivering the lowest quality wheat. This means that
the producers bringing higher quality wheat do not benefit in the fonn of higher price, and
thus have no incentive to deliver higher quality wheat.
Kiser and Frey's working paper on dockage survey results on the 1990 Kansas
wheat harvest showed that most of the grain elevators measured for dockage. However,
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only fifty-four percent of the respondents that reported they measured for dockage in
wheat subtracted the dockage from the net weight ofthe purchased wheat. Also, some
elevator operators planned to deduct for dockage but stopped the practice when nearby
competitors did not also adjust for dockage. However, the survey results only indicated
whether or not elevators were measuring for dockage; it did not determine if they were
discounting it correctly and checking for undesirable characteristics such as foreign matter
and shrunken and broken kernels.
Gunn and Wilson looked at grading and pricing practices ofNorth Dakota country
elevators for durum and hard red spring wheat. They conducted personal interviews with
77 country elevator managers to compare the grading practices ofcountry elevators to the
federal grain inspection standards. They found that some grading steps were skipped to
save time and money. Pricing strategies at these elevators were compared to determine if
location in the state, storage capacity, distance to competition, and the board price for
durum and hard red spring wheat affected their pricing strategies from country elevators.
The only important factor affecting pricing strategy was price offered for wheat protein,
which varied by location in the state. Therefore, GUM and Wilson found that elevators are
not grading as accurately as they could but their pricing practices are consistent with the
market.
Grading inaccuracy at country elevators is not a recent phenomenon. Farris
collected samples from Indiana country elevators for the 1955 wheat harvest season and
compared elevator grading and pricing practices to official grades measured at the Purdue
Agronomy Laboratory. Farris's results found that most elevators discounted less than the
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laboratory findings would indicate. Farris indicated that country elevators were afraid to
discount grain too heavily to avoid farmer dissatisfaction. Therefore, most of the country
elevators followed a practice ofgrading leniently. Farris found that for the 1955 harvest in
Indiana, there is evidence of considerable opportunity for increasing the effectiveness of
the wheat pricing system. Farris noted that the observed grading practices appear to
overvalue low quality wheat and fail to reward producers of high quality wheat. This
means that an incorrect price signal is sent to the producers, so that the qualities ofwheat
that consumers and the market really want is not revealed.
Summary
This review has demonstrated the concern with grain grading accuracy that the
grain industry and academic observers have shown historically. This concern has become
more pronounced as next-in-line buyers have begun to charge more substantial discounts
for wheat with less desirable characteristics.
The review has also noted several ways that have been suggested for improving
wheat quality. However, each of these has associated costs that must be compared with
their expected benefits. As Johnson and King note, most of the grain in traditional
marketing channels passes through country elevators, so prices set by country elevators
for wheat of various qualities provide important signals from world markets to producers.
Hill (1988) has argued that ifgrain quality characteristics were measured and recorded as
accurately as measurement technology permits, the market would establish value, reward
efforts to improve quality, and eliminate incentives for diminishing value of grain.
This research attempts to increase efficiency in wheat markets by measuring the
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extent to which country elevators should measure grain quality characteristics more
precisely, and the extent to which they should pass on premiums and discounts to
producers for various qualities of wheat. The research explicitly considers the tradeoff an
elevator faces between paying lower prices to receive a larger merchandising margin and
paying higher prices to attract enough grain to optimize capacity utilization. The results
help identify useful pricing strategies by individual elevators. They also have important
implications for the structure of the industry. If elevators are not able to pass on price
signals from consumers ofgrain to producers, the wheat industry may be forced into more
contracting arrangements or even vertical integration, as consumers express demand for
increasingly differentiated products.
The theoretical model introduced in Chapter 3 shows an elevator profit model. The
model shows an elevator's profit is dependent on the price paid to producers. This model
is modified because an elevator's profit is a function of price paid to producers,
competition price paid to producers, transportation cost, and density of production. This
modified model determines an elevator's trade area given space and competition. To find
the trade area of an elevator, mathematical equations are used to find the radius of the
trade area. The modified elevator model is used to determine an elevator's optimal grading
and pricing strategy to maximize profit.
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TIffiMODEL
Theoretical Model
Chapter 1 suggests that grain elevators are interested both in maintaining adequate
margins on the volume ofgrain they receive and in maximizing the use of their fixed
assets. Accurate grading and the correct price differentials passed on for the different
qualities ofgrain will maximize an elevator's margin on each bushel handled. However,
lenient grading techniques may help increase the volume ofgrain it receives from the
producer.
Chapter 2 discussed the importance ofaccurately grading grains and passing on the
correct price differentials to the producers because it is a very important mechanism to
improve the quality ofgrains in the United States. The model specified here will determine
the best grading and pricing strategy to maximize profit for a profit-maximizing elevator
facing competitors that are separated by space and transportation cost. In other words, the
elevator has a degree of spatial monopsony (Davis and Hill).
The objective ofa country elevator is assumed here to be profit maximization. It
performs only merchandising activities, which means grain is purchased from farmers and
sold directly to next-in-line (NIL) buyers. It is assumed that no grain is left in storage at
the country elevator at the end of harvest, so that quantity purchased from farmers equals
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quantity sold to Nll., buyers. Therefore, the elevator's profit function can be written as
(Adam, Attaway, Dicks, and Garrison):
(1)
where:
PML =
PI =
Cv =
Cft =
Q =
price received by the elevator from NIL buyers for wheat
price paid by the elevator to farmers for the average quality of wheat delivered
by farmers
variable merchandising costs
fixed costs
quantity purchased by elevator and sold to NIL buyers
The Elevator Model
The model above is extended to consider several specific factors that influence an
elevator's profit. The elevator chooses the price paid to farmers that maximizes profit. The
quantity received from producers by an elevator is a function of density of production in
the elevator's trade area, price offered to producers, competitor's price offered to
producers, and transportation cost. The model allows the elevator to pay different prices
for, and merchandise different quantities of, each of several qualities of wheat. The model
assumes that the elevator has three bins in which to segregate three different qualities of
wheat. The quality of wheat in each bin is detennined by the quality of wheat received
from producers (Kenkel, Anderson, and Attaway). From this, the elevator's model can be
expressed as:
)
•I'
r
)1
(2)
m "
Max Profit = L L [PN1LbQ;b - PfibQ;b(kj,Pjib'P Cjib' t,)] - CvibQ;b - Cft
Pjib b=1 ;=1
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where:
(3)
n
LQ1b
1=1
(4)
m n
Q = LLQ
'b
b=\ 1=1
where:
The assumptions for this profit maximization model, are summarized as follows:
a,
•
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price received from NIT.., buyer for blend b
price paid to farmers by elevator (pfib) for id!. quality used in blend b
price paid to farmers from competing elevator (pcfib) for jill quality
used in blend b
variable costs for handling ith quality in blend b
quantity of wheat ofid!. quality purchased by elevator for use in blend b
density of production of wheat of quality i in elevator's trade area (bu/m?)
distance (miles) between elevator (pfib) and competing elevator (pclib)
transportation cost for ilh quality ($/mi/bu)
pi (circumference of a circle divided by the diameter)
(3) Wheat production occurs in a homogeneous unbounded ptain at uniform
density ~.
(2) Transportation cost per bushel per mile is identical between any elevator and
any farm.
(1) The elevator and competing elevators have the same facility constraints.
Cvib =
Qib =
ki =
U =
11 =
7t =
P
MLb =
Pfib =
Pfib
(4) The market areas of the elevators are circular because they possess some
monopsony power (Capozza and Van Order).
(5) Producers know the quality of their wheat before they deliver it to the elevator.
Equation 3 provides a measure of the quantity ofwheat available in an elevator's
trade area. The elevator's trade area is assumed to be the area ofa circle surrounding the
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elevator (Bressler and King). The radius of the elevator's trade area depends on the
difference between the price paid to the producer by the elevator (Pfib) and the best
competitive price by another elevator (J>Cfib), adjusted for transportation cost. The law of
market areas asserts that the boundary between the two elevators is the locus of points
where market price net of transportation cost for loads of wheat shipped to Elevator Pfib
and Elevator pcfib are equal (Bressler and King). Modifying Capozza and Order's model
for oligopolistic firms, this can be mathematically expressed for oligopsonistic firms as
follows:
(5) Pfib - t;R =pcfib - ~ (U-R), where R is the radius of the elevator's market area.
This means that at the edge of an elevator's trade area, transportation-adjusted
price at the elevator is equal to transportation-adjusted price at a competing elevator. In
addition, producers may have a market for wheat other than elevators. Equation 5 can be
expressed as follows where x is the alternative value of wheat for use in say, cattle
With six competitors (J>Cfib) U miles away. each paying the same price, so that the
feeding:
(6) Pfib - t)t = Max (x, p Cfib - ~ (U-R»
elevator's trade area is circular. Therefore, the radius is equal to the following:
(7) R = 1/2t, (Pfib - max(x, pCfib - t; U»
When an elevator raises it's price and the competitor's firm stays the same, then
the radius of the trade area of the firm with the highest price will increase and the
competing firm's radius will decrease. Mathematically, the radius is equal to the following:
-
(8) R = 1/2t; (Pfib + .1Pfib - max (x, p Cfib - t; U)
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The area of the circle (the elevator's trade area), is 1t times the square of the radius
(R). The quantity ofwheat of quality i is detennined by multiplying by the production
density of wheat of quality i (kJ in the trade area.
Thus, the quantity of wheat purchased by the elevator is positively related to the
price paid by the elevator, with associated monopsony pricing characteristics, and to the
density of production, but negatively related to the competing price and transportation
cost. For a given price paid to fanners at the elevator, a higher transportation cost reduces
the net price paid to producers. Since transportation costs typically increase with distance
from the elevator, the farther a producer is from the elevator, the lower will be the net
price to the producer. At some distance from the elevator, the elevator price minus
transportation cost equals the producer's alternative price (which could be a competitor's
price net of transportation cost or the value ofalternative use for the grain such as for
feeding cattle), marking the edge of the elevator's trade area (Bressler and King). The
lower the price at the elevator, the higher the transportation rate, or the higher the value of
an alternative use for grain, the smaller the elevator's trade area. From the producer's
perspective, the lower the producer's alternative market value for grain the more
monopsony power that can be exerted by the elevator.
When the market price net of transfer cost is the same between two different
elevators, the law of market areas asserts that the boundary between two competing
markets is a straight line perpendicular to one connecting the two elevators. This means
prices paid to fanners hauling wheat to two different elevators are assumed to decrease
unifonnly in direct relation to the distances from each market, for the case where
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transportation cost is a linear function ofdistance (Tomek and Robinson). However, ifone
elevator raises its price and the other elevator leaves its price the same, the boundary line
will lie closer to the lower price elevator than to the higher price elevator. The line
becomes curvilinear, with the elevator with the higher price extending its trade area by
taking some of the competitor's trade area. Therefore, the boundary is a constant
difference in distances to the two markets, and the market boundary would be a hyperbola
(Bressler and King). The market boundary is a hyperbola because Bressler and King
assumes only two elevators competing against one another.
For example, in Figure 3.1, Elevator A, paying price Pfib, and Elevator B, paying
price pcfib' are located 40 miles from each other and each concentric circle represents an
additional 5 miles distance from an elevator. First, suppose that transportation cost is
$.Ol/bu/rni and that Elevator A and Elevator B both set the price ofwheat at $3.00 per
bushel. The law ofmarket areas asserts that the boundary between the two elevators is the
locus of points where market prices net of transportation cost for loads of wheat shipped
to Elevator A (Pfib) and Elevator B (pcfib) are equal (Bressler and King). Equations 5 and
7 are used to solve for the boundary and the radius. Since prices and per mile transport
costs for the two different elevators are the same, the price boundary is a straight line that
lies halfway between the two markets and is perpendicular to one connecting the two
elevators. The straight line joins point b, which is equidistant from the two markets at
$2.80 per bushel and it joins points a and c at $2.75 per bushel.
IfElevator A raises its price to $3.25 per bushel while elevator B keeps its price at
$3.00 per bushel, the boundary becomes a curved line because the price is higher in one
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Figure 3.1
Spatial CompetitionBetween Two Elevators
34
$3.00
--
elevator than in the other. Since transportation cost is the same for the two elevators, and
is a linear function ofdistance, the boundary line will lie closer to the lower price elevator
than to the higher price elevator. The boundary starts at point fat $2.925 per bushel and
intersects points e and gat $2.90 per bushel. This means farmers located at points e and g
receive $2.90 per bushel regardless ofwhere they sell their wheat, while fanners at points
d and h receive $2.85 per bushel. Fanners at point f receive $2.925 per bushel regardless
ofwhere they sell their wheat. This shows the market boundary to be the shape of a
hyperbola. This means prices paid to producers will strongly determine the trade area of a
certain elevator.
Theoretically, Figure 3.1 is correct if there are only two elevators competing
against each other. The market boundary would be shaped'like a hyperbola if one elevator
has a higher price than a competing elevator net of transportation cost. However, there are
usually more than two elevators competing against each other in the Oklahoma wheat
market. Capozza and Van Order assumed there are six competitors surrounding each firm
where each surrounding finn is a small proportion of the total competition faced by the
firm. If this is correct, then the market boundary would not be shaped like a hyperbola for
the higher priced elevator. Many competing elevators surrounding an elevator would make
that elevator's trade area approximate a circle. An elevator paying a higher price would
extend the radius of its trade area.
Using the model by Capozza and Van Order implies that the elevator's trade area
will be circular, regardless of the price differences between an elevator and its competitors
net of transportation cost. This means the price offered to producers will determine the
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radius of the circle shaped market area of an elevator. There has been great controversy
on what is the true shape ofa market area for a firm to maximize profit. Mills and Lav
hypothesize the shape to be circular while Greenhut claims it to be hexagonal. Greenhut
states that the hexagon fills up empty spaces which the circle cannot do. Greenhut claims
that the hexagon would be more profitable than its inscribed circle in competitive
equilibrium. However, Mills and Lav state that a firm will always choose a circular market
area unless competitors constrain it to some other market-area fonn. This is because finns
prefer circular market areas because if a firm finds it profitable to buy from a producer t
miles away in one direction, it must be profitable to buy from a producer t miles away in
each direction. Mills and Lav present proof that under certain cost and demand
relationships, a circular market area ofa given size would provide greater profits under
competition than would a hexagon of that same size. Therefore, spatial competition need
not result in space-filling market areas to maximize profit for a finn. Therefore, this paper
uses a circular shape for the market area of an elevator.
Following Capozza and Van Order, Figure 3.2 shows six competing elevators
(represented by elevator B) located around an elevator (A). This figure shows that, due to
many competitors, the trade area ofan elevator will approximate a circular shape
regardless of the different prices offered to the producers net of transportation cost. The
radius (R) of elevator A's trade area is marked by a circle around A. Wheat production
inside each circle has unifonn density (k; bushels per square mile) and the transportation
cost is identical between any elevator and farm at t j units per mile per bushel. The distance
from the elevator (A) to its competitors (B ) is U. The next section discusses the other
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Spatial Competition Among Many Elevators
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reasons besides space and competition why elevators tend to grade and price wheat
incorrectly to producers.
Other Reasons Country Elevators Bids May Not Reflect Quality Differences
Other explanations are discussed briefly on why country elevators don't pass on
the correct discounts to producers resulting in pricing inefficiencies in the grain marketing
system. The model and simulation analysis ignore these factors because they are difficult
to display in a mathematical model. Farmers face price risk in that they don't know exactly
the quality characteristics of their wheat. They don't know until the wheat is delivered to
the elevator the final price they wiU receive after the elevator discounts for quality levels
that are lower than expected. This paper assumes a fanner knows the quality ofwheat
they bring in.
Compounding this risk is the possibility that, as prospect theory suggests, farmers
value discounts differently than premiums, so that a discount decreases utility more than a
premium of the same magnitude increases it. For example, farmers might prefer to take
their wheat to an elevator that is not checking for dockage and offering an average price
than to an elevator that is charging discounts for high dockage and offering premiums for
low dockage wheat. The theory suggests that farmers are more adversely affected by the
possibility ofa discount for low quality wheat than they are positively affected by an equal
probability ofa premium for high-quality wheat (Benartzi and Thaler).
Country elevators face competition in their trading area from other elevators. This
could be the reason that elevators are afraid to adopt new grading practices to discount
properly for low quality wheat and reward producers for high quality wheat. If prospect
38
,
1
I II,
I,
I
I
. ,
-theory is correct, an elevator may believe that discounting for low-quality wheat will cause
farmers to go to other elevators that are not discounting, even though it is also offering
premiums for high-quality wheat. Therefore, quantity purchased from farmers may also
depend on other factors such as risk faced by fanners and the effects on producer
preferences explained by prospect theory. These factors all could affect the profit
maximizing pricing decisions ofa country elevator. However, they are not included in this
analysis, and further research should address them.
Summary
Grain elevators need to know the prices they should pay to producers for wheat of
different quality levels to profit from grading correctly and passing on the appropriate
premiums/discounts. It is expected that the results from objectives I and 2 will show that
at some magnitude of price differences paid by NIL buyers for different qualities of wheat,
elevators will find it profitable to grade correctly and pass on correct price differentials,
Chapter 4 describes the procedures and various data used to calibrate the model.
The elevator model in the next chapter takes the form of a simulation analysis to determine
the optimal grading and pricing practices that should be used by an elevator given
particular operating environments.
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Chapter IV
PROCEDURES
Chapter 4 describes the data and procedures used in the simulation analysis. A
simulation analysis is used to determine the optimal grading and pricing strategies under
various scenarios for country elevators.
Model Specification
This section describes the scenarios over which elevator's grading and pricing
decisions are simulated. A range of parameters that reflects elevator operating and
competitive environments is considered. For each set of parameters, a profit maximizing
algorithm chooses the optimal prices the elevator should pay producers for different
qualities of wheat. The range of parameters chosen reflects the range of conditions
observed in the 1995, 1996, and 1997 harvests, as well as from 1990.
Wheat grown in an elevator's trade area is assumed to fall into any of three quality
categories: high, middle, and low. As wheat is harvested and delivered to the elevator, the
elevator may choose to grade each unit of wheat delivered to determine whether it is high,
middle, or low quality wheat. If it does so, it can keep the different qualities separate to
receive the highest possible price from Nll... buyers. In practice, elevators may additionally
increase profits by blending to take advantage of the discrete differences between quality
levels. In this model, however, since each load of grain delivered to the elevator fits
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precisely into one of the three strategies, blending provides no additional benefit in most
scenarios. Further, to maximize profits, the elevator may choose to pay producers
different prices for the different qualities ofwheat to encourage delivery of more high
quality wheat. The elevator's choices are hypothesized to depend on prices paid by NIL
buyers for the different qualities ofwheat, amount ofwheat produced in the elevator's
trade area, the relative amounts of each quality ofwheat produced in the elevator's trade
area, and on the type of response by competing elevators to the elevator's grading/pricing
strategy.
To focus on the benefits to an elevator of grading correctly and of paying prices to
producers that depend on quality, the simulations are organized into three possible
grading/pricing strategies, and three possible competitive industry structures. The three
grading/pricing strategies are: I) an elevator grades and segregates the wheat received,
and also pays producers prices that differ according to the quality of wheat they deliver; 2)
an elevator grades the wheat received and segregates it to receive prices from NIL buyers
that are adjusted for quality, but it pays producers one price for all qualities of wheat; and
3) an elevator does not grade the wheat received, nor does it segregate the wheat into
different qualities or pay different prices to producers for different qualities.
The three competitive structures are: I) an elevator is a perfect monopsony, with
no competition in its potential trade area; 2) an elevator has a competitor that formulates
its grading/pricing strategy independently of the first elevator; and 3) an elevator has a
competitor that copies its grading/pricing strategy exactly.
The three grading/pricing strategies combined with the three possible competitive
41
-structures make up nine scenarios. For each of these scenarios, the sensitivity of the
elevator's optimal pricing decisions to a range ofparameters is simulated. The range of
parameters represents the range ofvalues observed from 1990 to 1997.
Following the spatial competition model described in the previous chapter (Figure
3.2), Elevator A is assumed to be the leader in grading/pricing strategies, and elevator B is
assumed to be the follower. Elevator B is representative ofthe six elevators that surround
Elevator A. It is assumed the six competing elevators are located around elevator A at a
distance of40 miles. The scenarios are summarized in an outline as follows:
Competitive Structure 1. No Competition (Elevator A is a Perfect Monopsony)
Strategy 1.
Elevator A Grades and Segregates (pays Different Quality Prices)
Strategy 2.
Elevator A Grades and Segregates (pays One Average Price)
Strategy 3.
Elevator A Does Not Grade or Segregate (pays One Average Price)
Competitive Structure 2. Competition (Elevators A and B Don't Copy Each Other)
Strategy 1.
Elevator A Grades and Segregates (pays Different Quality Prices)
Elevator B Grades and Segregates (pays One Average Price)
Strategy 2.
Elevator A Grades and Segregates (pays Different Quality Prices)
Elevator B Does Not Grade or Segregate (pays One Average Price)
Strategy 3.
Elevator A Grades and Segregates (pays One Average Price)
Elevator B Does Not Grade or Segregate (pays One Average Price)
Competitive Structure 3. Competition (Elevators A & B Copy Each Other)
Strategy 1.
Elevators A & B Grade and Segregate (pay Different Quality Prices)
Strategy 2.
Elevators A & B Grade and Segregate (pay One Average Price)
Strategy 3.
Elevators A & B Do Not Grade or Segregate (pay One Average Price)
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No Competition
In the first scenario. an extreme case where the elevator has no competition is
assumed. Three different grading and pricing practices are considered. The first strategy is
that elevator A grades and segregates the wheat received. and also pays producers prices
prices from NIL buyers that are adjusted for quality. The model is mathematically shown
that differ according to the quality ofwheat they deliver. Elevator A segregates to receive
as follows:
(9)
where:
(10)
(11)
(12)
where:
,.
Mp8X Profit = L [PNILP; - PfiQ;(k;,Pfi.I)J - CVl.Qi - Cftfi ;=1
,. ,. p - x.L Q; = L kJ7t( Ii 'iI. for all i
1=1 i=1 II
-
PN!U = price received from NIL buyer for quality i (Slbu)
PI; = price paid to farmers by elevator (A) for ith quality (Slbu)
Xi = alternative outlet price to producer for wheat ofquality i
Cy; = variable costs for handling ith quality
Q; = quantity ofwheat ofith quality purchased by elevator
k; = density of production of wheat of quality i in elevator's trade area (bu/m?)
Ii = transportation cost for ith quality (Slbu/mi)
7t pi (circumference of a circle divided by the diameter)
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In the second strategy, the elevator A grades the wheat received and segregates it
to receive prices from Nll., buyers that are adjusted for quality, but it pays producers one
price for all qualities of wheat. Elevator A's objective function can be expressed as:
(13)
where:
,.
Mpax Profit = LPNIL,Qi - PfLQlk,~Pf't;,x) - C..,;Qi - Cft
f ;=1
PI = price paid to farmers by elevator (Pfi) for wheat ofall qualities.
Finally, in the third strategy, elevator A does not grade the wheat received, nor
does it segregate the wheat into different qualities or pay different prices to producers for
different qualities. The elevator's objective function can be expressed as:
(14)
where:
n
Mpax Profit = PNlLL Q; - Pf2Jk,'pf't;,x) - Cv;Q i - Cft
f 1=1
--
PNIL = price received by the elevator from NIT.. buyers for all wheat merchandised
Competition (Elevators Don't Copy Each Other)
For this competitive structure, there are assumed to be six competitors located
around elevator~ 40 miles away (see Figure 3.2 in Ch. 3). It is assumed that elevator Ns
competitors (represented by elevator B) maximize profits, but pay the same price for all
qualities regardless ofA's prices within this structure.
The first strategy specifies that elevators A and B grade and segregate the wheat
received to receive prices from NIT.. buyers that are adjusted for quality. However,
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elevator A pays producers prices that differ according to the quality ofwheat they deliver,
but elevator B pays producers one price for all qualities ofwheat. Thus, A iteratively
solves expression (15), while B iteratively solves expression (17).
(15)
where:
(16)
(17)
where:
(18)
"Mpu Profit =L [PNlLP; - PjiQ;Ck;,Pji'P Cf'l i )] - CviQ; - eft
ji ;=1
Q. = k.[1t(_l(Pji - max(x,P cr - t.[/»2)], flor all i
, I 2/. '
,
"M~ Profit =~ [PNlLP; - PrLQ;(k;,Pf'pcfi,t)] - C\lIQ; - Cft
Q = k.[1t(_1(P
r
- max(x,P cji - t.[/»2)], for all i
I I 2t. '
,
= price paid to farmers by competing elevators for ith quality
price paid to farmers by competing elevators for all qualities
= distance between elevator(A) and competing elevators
-
In the iterative process, the price paid to producers by competing elevators
(represented by elevator B) is itself the result of elevator B optimizing some variant of
expression (17) with Pfi representing elevator B's price to producers and pc6 representing
elevator A's price to producers. The expressions are solved iteratively. First, A solves for
its price(s) given some starting value for B's competing prices. Then B solves for its
price(s) using A's solution as the competing price(s). Then A solves again for its price(s)
using B's solution as updated competing price(s). The iterations continue until neither A
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nor B changes its optimal price(s) from one iteration to the next by more than some small
amount epsilon.
The second strategy is the same as the first strategy except that A's competitors do
not grade or segregate; they receive a blend price for the average quality ofwheat they
merchandise. Thus, A iteratively solves expressions (15) while B iteratively solves
expression (19).
(19)
where:
(20) Q. = k.[1t(_1(Pr - max(x'pCfi - lD)2)], for all iI I 21. I
I
, .
In the third strategy, elevator A grades and segregates the wheat received, but pays
producers one price for all qualities of wheat. Elevator B does not grade the wheat
received, nor does it segregate the wheat into different qualities or pay different prices to
producers for different qualities. Therefore, elevator A solves expressions (21) while B
iteratively solves expressions (23).
(21)
where:
(22) Q. = k.[1t(_1(Pf - max(x,P cf - t.U)i)], for all iI I 2/ '
I
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(23)
where:
(24) Qi = kJ7t( 21t (PI - max(x,P CI - tll)2)], for all i
t
In this competitive structure, pc:fi, price paid to farmers by competing elevators,
(represented by elevator B) is itself the result of elevator B optimizing equations 17, 19, or
23 with PIi' representing elevator B's price to producers and pc:Ii representing elevator
A's price to producers. The optimizations are solved iteratively. First A solves for either
expressions 15 or 21 given some starting value for B 's competing price. Then B solves
expressions 17, 19, or 23 using A's solution as the competing price. Then A solves
expressions 15 or 21 using B's solution as the competing price. This iteration combination
continues until neither A nor B changes its optimal price from one iteration to the next by
more than some small amount epsilon.
Competition (Elevators Copy Each Other)
For the third competitive structure, there are assumed to be six competitors located
around elevator A, 40 miles away, as with the second competitive structure (see Figure
3.2 in Ch. 3). However, in the third competitive structure, all elevators are assumed to
follow elevator A's grading and pricing strategies.
Three different grading and pricing strategies are considered. The first strategy is
that elevator A and its competitors grade and segregate the wheat received, and also pay
producers prices that differ according to the quality of wheat they receive. The model is
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mathematically shown as equation 25.
and segregate to receive prices from NIL buyers that are adjusted for quality, but they pay
(25)
where:
(26) Q. = k.[1t(_l(Pft - max(x'p eft - tJJ»)2)], for all ;I 1 2t '
I
For the second strategy, elevator A and its competitors grade the wheat received
.
II
producers one price for all qualities of wheat. In the second scenario, each elevator's
objective function can be expressed as equation 21.
Finally, in the third strategy, elevator A and its competitors do not grade the wheat
received, nor do they segregate the wheat into different qualities or pay different prices to
producers for different qualities. Each elevator's objective function can be expressed as
equation 23.
In this competitive structure, pcfi , price paid to farmers by competing elevators,
(represented by elevator B) is itself the result of elevator B optimizing equations 21,23, or
25 with Pfj, representing elevator B's price to producers and pefi representing elevator A's
price to producers. The optimizations are solved iteratively. First A solves for either
expressions 21, 23, or 25 given some starting value for B's competing price. Then B
solves expressions 21, 23, or 25 using A's solution as the competing price. Then A solves
expressions 21, 23, or 25 using B's solution as the competing price. This iteration
combination continues until neither A nor B changes its optimal price from one iteration to
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the next by more than some small amount epsilon.
Ifan elevator does not segregate the wheat into three qualities in the models
above. it would receive one average price from NIL buyers. This is a naive sort of
blending because they are just mixing together all the wheat purchased; the elevator
receives one average price from NIL buyers. This is modeled by first multiplying the
quantity of wheat ofquality i by the number i. for all i. Ifthis weighted average is less than
1.1, it receives the quality 1 price~ if the average is less than 2.1 but greater than 1.1. it
receives the quality 2 price~ and if the average is greater than 2.1 it receives quality 3
price. For example, if 10.000 bushels are quality 1, 50,000 bushels are quality 2, and
20.000 bushels are quality 3, the weighted average quality is (10,000 x 1 + 50.000 x 2 +
20.000 x 3)/90.000 = 1.9. This mixture of wheat would receive the price for quality 2
wheat. The dividing lines between qualities ofwheat are chosen arbitrarily. but changing
those lines does not change the results qualitatively~ using other dividing lines would
change the relative profitability of segregating the wheat vs. blending, and this itself
depends on the proportion of each quality ofwheat available in the elevator's trade area.
Thus. the sensitivity analysis conducted for varying proportions of each quality level
provides perspective on how the results might change if this blending rule is changed.
Grain Grading System
This section reviews data that are used to parameterize the simulation. In the last
two or three years, domestic and international markets have begun to tighten grain quality
requirements and the marketing system has begun to impose its own system of grades and
standards. Hard red winter wheat in the United States is graded based on physical quality
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characteristics outlined in the Official U.S. Standards for Grain (FGIS 1997). Grades for
wheat are based on test weight, foreign material, shrunken and broken kernels (SBK),
damaged kernels, and total defects, which is a combination of foreign material. shrunken
and broken kernels, and damaged kernels. There are five numerical grades of hard red
winter wheat, where #1 represents the highest quality. Wheat which does not meet the
requirements for #5 is considered U.S. Sample Grade (S.G.) and can be used only in
nonfood products. The nongrade factors are dockage and moisture and are reported on
the official grain ticket but do not determine the numerical grade of wheat.
From Chapter 2, Kenkel, Anderson, and Attaway stated that the three most
important steps in grain grading were the determination ofdockage, test weight, and
shrunken and broken kernels. Figures 4.1,4.2,4.3, and 4.4 show the change in discount
schedules from 1990 to the more stricter 1995, 1996, and 1997 schedules for grades,
dockage, test weight, and shrunken and broken kernels.
Figure 4.1 shows that Nll.. buyers no longer discount for the numerical grade of
hard red winter wheat as they did in 1990. On the other hand, Nil., buyers have begun to
discount more strictly for grade and nongrade determining factors. Thus, specific factors
have replaced the numerical grade in Nil.. buyers' discount schedules.
Figure 4.2 shows the changes in discounts for test weight from 1990 to 1995,
1996, and 1997. This figure shows that NIL buyers discounted for low test weight in each
of those years. According to Flagg, test weight is the most reliable indication of potential
flour yield, which means that low test weight reduces flour mill profits. Thus, test weight
has been important for many years because it is positively related to the end use
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Figure 4.1
Grade Discounts From Nfi.., Buyers
For 1990, 1995, 1996, and 1997 Wheat Harvest
[Grade Discountsl
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#4 #5
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01995
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.
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-
Source: 1990 information -- Adam, Kenkel, and Anderson
1995 and 1996 information -- Kenkel, Anderson, and Attaway
1997 information -- Farmland Grain Division
Figure 4.2
Test Weight Discounts From NIL Buyers
For 1990, 1995, 1996, and 1997 Wheat Harvest
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Source 1990 information -- Adam, Kenkel, and Anderson
1995 and 1996 information -- Kenkel, Anderson, and Attaway
1997 information -- Farmland Grain Division
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Figure 4.3
Dockage Discounts From NTI.., Buyers
For 1990, 1995, 1996, and 1997 Wheat Harvest
Dockage Discounts (in addition to net weight deduction)
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Figure 4.4
SBK Discounts From NTI.., Buyers
For 1990, 1995, 1996, and 1997 Wheat Harvest
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characteristics ofwheat.
Figure 4.3 shows the changes in discounts for dockage from 1990 to 1995, 1996,
and 1997. The figure shows that NIT.. buyers have become stricter on dockage. In 1990,
there were no discounts for dockage except that its weight is subtracted from the net
weight ofa load. However, in 1995, 1996, and 1997, dockage discounts were imposed, in
addition to the deduction from weight, and are becoming increasingly important. China,
the largest buyer ofU.S. wheat, has indicated that it will buy wheat with eight tenths of
one percent dockage or less. Japan, the second largest buyer ofUS. wheat, has indicated
that it is limiting dockage to five tenths of one percent. This shows that importing
countries are demanding a cleaner product, and dockage discounts will get tougher
(Johnston Grain Company). Flagg states that overseas millers do not want dockage
because the transportation cost on dockage reduces profit.
Figure 4.4 shows the changes in discounts for shrunken and broken kernels from
1990 to 1995,1996, and 1997. In 1990, there were no discounts for shrunken and broken
kernels, but discounts were imposed for the 1995, 1996, and 1997 harvests. This is
because domestic and international buyers are demanding a higher quality product. Flagg
states that a lot of shrunken and broken kernels results in low test weight wheat.
These figures show that the grade factors and other nongrade quality factors have
become increasingly important to the elevators' grading and pricing practices. Country
elevators must now decide the extent to which they should impose these tighter standards
on producers by passing on different prices for various quaJities ofwheat. Wrigley states
that the obvious strategy of ensuring that grain of appropriate quality is provided to the
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market is to correctly grade for wheat when it is delivered to the country elevator. to
segregate grain of different quality types into different bins, and to pay producers correct
price differentials for the different qualities. Wrigley noted that this has worked well in
Australia for many years. However, there are three drawbacks to grading correctly:
testing must be fast (preferably less than 3 min, while the truck is waiting), the increase in
market value must be large enough to justify the extra cost of testing and segregation, and
the risk of losing business to competitors by correctly grading. Brennan mentions two
reasons for implementing differential payments on the basis of quality: (a) redistribute
current payments to the producers whose wheat contributes the most value to the overall
profits of an elevator, and (b) provide incentives for farmers to improve the quality of
wheat delivered.
Grain Quality Data
Harvest-time quality data from Oklahoma country elevators have been collected
for the 1995, 1996. and 1997 hard red winter wheat harvests (Kenkel, Anderson, and
Attaway). These data provide official measurements from FGIS of several wheat quality
characteristics, and are used to estimate the distributions of these characteristics in loads
of wheat delivered to elevators at harvest. These data are broken down by the yearly NIL
discount schedule to determine the different prices that are paid for the different qualities
of wheat. Appendix table A.I shows the different qualities of wheat that were distributed
throughout Oklahoma during the 1995 harvest. These data were collected from 1,314
loads of wheat delivered by farmers to 16 different elevators. Appendix table A.2
represents the different qualities of wheat that were distributed throughout Oklahoma
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during the 1996 harvest. These data were collected from 13 elevators and 1.366 loads.
Appendix table A3 represents the different quality characteristics ofwheat that were
distributed throughout Oklahoma during the 1997 harvest. These data came from 14
Oklahoma country elevators and 1,2S110ads. These data are used to provide a
representative range of relative quality densities for the simulation model.
Hard red winter wheat discount schedules implemented by Nil.. buyers during the
1995 and 1996 harvests were collected from Kenkel, Anderson, and Attaway. A 1997 Nil..
discount schedule from Farmland Grain Division is used to represent discounts imposed by
NIL buyers for the 1997 harvest. Appendix tables A4, AS, and A6 show these discount
schedules.
For this study, only test weight, dockage, and SBK are considered when
determining how elevators should grade and price wheat for the 1995, 1996, and 1997
harvests. These three characteristics are considered because they are three most important
steps in the grading process. Appendix tables A 7, A8, and A.9 show the quality
distribution of test weight, dockage, and SBK categorized by high quality, middle quality,
and low quality for the 1995, 1996, and 1997 harvests. These tables also show the NIL
buyer discounts on each quality level for test weight, dockage, and SBK.
Although the discount schedules do not reflect any premiums paid for high quality
wheat, but rather discount from the highest price for less than top quality. This assumes
the base price for wheat is the price for middle quality wheat. It assumes there are
premiums offered for high quality wheat, and discounts imposed for low quality wheat.
The reason for this departure is to ensure that comparing the effects of varying the size of
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discounts does not at the same time change the simulated average price paid for wheat
production.
The Oklahoma Agricultural Statistics Service is used to estimate the density of
wheat production for representative wheat-producing districts. The density of production
in an elevator's trade area (bu/mi~ is calculated by taking the bushels per fannland acre
times 640 acre/square mile. Farmland acres includes all land in Oklahoma in farms. This is
a total of32, 143,030 acres ofland, or 73.1% of the total land area in Oklahoma
(Oklahoma Agricultural Census).
The density ofproduction is summarized by nine Agricultural Statistical Reporting
Districts consisting of the Panhandle, West Central, Southwest, North Central, Central,
South Central, Northeast, East Central, and the Southeast Districts. The total fann land
area for each district is calculated and multiplied by the production of each district, to get
the production density. Yield data from 1997 has not yet been released. Appendix tables
AlO and All show the density of production ofwheat for each district and the overall
average for Oklahoma for 1995 and 1996.
Simulation Analysis
Simulations are run over a range of parameter values that reflect elevator
operating conditions under three different scenarios and three different strategies for each
one. For each set of parameters, the choice variables (price(s) paid to producers for wheat
of different qualities) that maximize profit are selected for the main elevator and the
competing elevators. GAUSS is used to run the simulations; each iteration within the
simulation is solved using the constrained optimization module.
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The data discussed above are used to select a range ofparameters that reflect
elevator operating and competitive environments. For the base simulation, differentials for
each quality of$0.10, with a base price of $4.90 per bushel, are used. This means that
$5.00 is paid for high quality wheat, $4.90 is paid for middle quality wheat, and $4.80 is
paid for low quality wheat. The production density that is used is 2,174 bushels per square
mile, the average production density throughout Oklahoma in 1995. Ofthis production, it
is assumed that l00!c. is high quality, 60% middle quality, and 300!c. low quality. This is
consistent with the relative proportions of test weight observed in the Oklahoma region in
1995.
Sensitivity Analysis
A sensitivity analysis is conducted on the scenarios above to reflect an overall
picture of an elevator's operating and competitive environments for the 1995, 1996, and
1997 wheat harvests. Price differentials are varied from $.10 to $.08, $.06, $.04, $.02, and
$.00 to reflect potential changes in premiums and discounts offered by NIT.- buyers. Next,
the production densities are varied to include 1,000, 2,174, and 4,000 bushels per square
mile to represent the amount ofwheat produced in different areas of Oklahoma. Also, the
relative distribution ofhigh quality, middle quality, and low quality wheat is varied. First,
10% high quality, 60% middle quality, and 30% low quality i.s used. It then is varied to
30% high quality, 40010 middle quality, and 30% low quality. Finally, it is changed to 50%
high quality, 20% middle quality, and 30% low quality. These quality levels are used to
represent the changes in the quality levels for different harvest years.
The results of the analysis will be useful in assessing the effects ofvarying
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operating environments on elevator strategies. Much ofthe variation in parameters
modeled by the sensitivity analysis was realized over the three crop years of 1995, 1996,
and 1997, and across production regions in Oklahoma. For example, the 1995 wheat
harvest in Oklahoma was known as a high dockage year, with an average of4% dockage.
The 1996 crop year was a drought year, with low production. The 1997 crop year was a
freeze year but production densities were still high because the freeze affected only the
southwest part of the state. The results will also provide insight into the effects of
particular strategies had they actually been implemented in those years.
Cost Data
This paper assumes producers use trucks to haul their wheat to country elevators,
which transport the wheat to next-in-line buyers. FuUer used models containing linear
mileage equations to determine truck cost. The model from Fuller represents short haul
costs as well as long hauls. The transportation cost estimated by Fuller is $.00108 per
bushel per mile. NIL buyer prices are specified to be prices actually received by country
elevators after paying transportation cost. The transportation cost used by Fuller assumes
a truck with a hopper and bottom dump that can hold 833 bushels. These costs are used in
the simulation analysis to determine an elevator's trade area.
Data for both fixed and variable elevator operating costs is taken from Kenkel and
Anderson (1992). Fixed cost include depreciation, administrative overhead, market
information, and interest and is assumed to be $100,000. Variable costs include labor,
utility, chemical, and repairs. Variable cost are assumed to be $.05 cents per bushel. The
fixed and variable costs assumed used are an average of the estimates by Kenkel and
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Anderson's work ofgrain handling cost at Oklahoma elevators.
Finally, elevators that grade wheat are assumed to purchase a Carter-Day Dockage
Tester (which is used by the official inspection agencies), at an estimated cost of $5,000.
This model assumes that an elevator that is grading correctly purchases a mechanical
dockage machine. This grading machine amortized over a 20-year life at lOO,fo interest, for
an annual cost of $587 at 1,000,000 bushels/year throughput. Also, grading correctly and
segregating is assumed to require one additional worker at an elevator. The additional
worker is required at the leg and dump pits to segregate the qualities ofwheat. The
additional worker is assumed to cost $]2 an hour for 52 weeks at 40 hours per week
during the year. This results in an additional $25,000 variable cost per year; for an elevator
handling 1,500,00 bushels per year, average variable cost would increase from $.05/bushel
to $.067/bushel if the elevator began to grade and segregate the wheat. Also, the elevator
that is correctly grading segregates three different qualities into three bins for sale directly
to NIT... buyers. It is assumed elevators require no additional capital or equipment to
segregate up to three different qualities ofwheat since most elevators already have
facilities appropriate for that.
Summary
Three competitive structures, with three possible grading and pricing strategies for
each one are simulated. The simulation uses base numbers ofS4.90 per bushel for middle
quality wheat, with a premium of SO.1 O/bushel for high quality wheat and a discount of
SO.10/bushel for low quality wheat, and production density of2, 174 bushels per square
mile, consisting of 10% high quality, 60% middle quality, and 30% low quality wheat. A
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sensitivity analysis is ran conducted from the base levels, varying the production densities,
price differentials, and quality levels to determine the best grading and pricing strategy for
test weight, dockage, and SBK for the 1995, 1996, and 1997 harvests.
Chapter 5 describes the results of the simulations and determines the optimal
grading and pricing strategies for each competitive structure. This will show ifgrading
correctly by elevators will increase profits, and answers the question to what extent
elevators should pass on to producers the premiums and discounts received from NIL
buyers.
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Chapter V
SIMULATION RESULTS
This chapter presents the results of the simulation and sensitivity analysis to
determine the effects ofcompetition and other variables on optimal grading and pricing
strategies. The simulations run consist of nine different scenarios, as explained in Chapter
4.
Simulation Results
The numbers used in the simulation analysis consisted ofa base price of $4.90 paid
by NIT.. buyers to country elevators, with a $O.lOlbu. price differential/between qualities.
Therefore, NIL buyers pay $5.00 for high quality wheat, $4.90 for middle quality wheat,
and $4.80 for low quality wheat to the elevators that are segregating by the different
qualities. The elevators that are not segregating receive one price from NlL buyers of
either $5.00, $4.90, or $4.80, depending on the average quality of wheat received. The
production density used was 2,174 bushels per square mile. Wheat in the elevator's trade
area is assumed to consist of l00!o high quality, 60% middle quality, and 30% low quality
wheat. This was the actual quality distribution of test weight for the 1995 harvest.
No Competition
In the first competitive structure, the elevator is a perfect monopsony, with no
competition in its potential trade area. It is assumed that the best alternative use for wheat
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is for livestock feed, with a value at $3.00 per bushel. Tables 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 show the
results under this structure.
The first strategy is where elevator A grades and segregates the wheat received,
and also pays producers prices that differ according to the quality ofwheat they deliver.
As indicated in table 5.1, Elevator A achieves a profit of$94.42 million with a trade area
radius of 161 miles for the high quality, 153 miles for the middle quality, and 144 miles for
the low quality. However, the prices paid by the elevator -- $4.29/bu. for high quality,
$4.22/bu. for middle quality, and $4.15/bu. for low quality -- show that the country
elevator should absorb some ofthe price differential between qualities. It passes on $.07
ofthe price differential to the producer and absorbs 3 cents of it; in other words, the
elevator passes on the producer only 70% ofthe price differential it receives from NIL
buyers..
Table 5.2 shows the results of the second strategy. In this strategy, elevator A
grades the wheat received and segregates it to receive prices from NlL buyers that are
adjusted for quality, but pays producers one price for all qualities ofwheat. It receives a
profit of $94.11 million. It pays producers $4.21Ibu. for all the qualities and has a trade
area radius of 151 miles for all the qualities.
Table 5.3 shows the results of third strategy in which elevator A does not grade
the wheat received, nor does it segregate the wheat into different qualities or pay different
prices to producers for different qualities. This model shows a profit of$84.63 million,
which is much lower than that achieved with other strategies. It pays a price of $4.17 for
all qualities and has a trade area of 146 miles for all qualities.
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Table 5.1
Structure 1: Strategy I, Results ofElevator A Maximizing Profits:
No Competition, Elevator A Grades and Segregates (Pays Different Quality Prices)
Elevator Quality
(Radius)
Prices Prices Paid Quantity
by NIL Buyers to Producers Purchased from
(S/bu.) (Slbu.) Producers (bu.) Profit
A High Quality (161) 5.00
Middle Quality (153) 4.90
Low Quality (144) 4.80
4.29
4.22
4.15
17.72M
95.61 M
43.73 M
S94.42M
Alternative Price = $3.00/bu.
Table 5.2
Structure I: Strategy 2, Results of Elevator A Maximizing Profits:
No Competition. Elevator A Grades and Segregates (pays One Average Price)
Elevator Quality
(Radius)
Prices Prices Paid Quantity
by NIL Buyers to Producers Purchased from
($/bu.) (S/bu.) Producers (bu.) Profit
A High Quality (151) 5.00
Middle Quality (151) 4.90
Low Quality (151) 4.80
4.21
4.21
4.21
15.59M
93.54 M
46.77 M
$94.11 M
Alternative Price = $3.00/bu.
Table 5.3
Structure I: Strategy 3, Results of Elevator A Maximizing Profits:
No Competition, Elevator A Does Not Grade or Segregate (pays One Average Price)
Prices Prices Paid Quantity
Elevator Quality by NIL Buyers to Producers Purchased from
(Radius) ($/bu.) (S/bu.) Producers (bu.) Profit
A High Quality (146) 4.80
Middle Quality (146) 4.80
Low Quality (146) 4.80
4.17
4.17
4.17
14.52 M
87.15 M
43.58M
$84.63 M
Alternative Price =S3.00/bu.
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The results for the no competition structure show that the most profitable strategy
is when elevator A grades and segregates, and pays producers different prices for different
qualities. However, only 70% ofthe price differences received from ND..- buyers are
passed on to the producers. Figure 5.1 show trade areas of the different qualities for
elevator A under each strategy. Strategy 1 under the no competition structure achieves
the highest profits because elevator A receives relatively more of the high and middle
quality wheat.
Competition (Elevators Don't Copy Each Other)
This competitive structure on it has three different strategies. Tables 5.4, 5.5, and
5.6 show the results of the three strategies for this scenario when elevator A has six
competitors located around it, 40 miles away. Elevator A is assumed to be the leader in
grading/pricing strategies, and elevator B is assumed to be the competitors that follow.
This scenario is where the competition formulates it grading/pricing strategy independ,ently
of elevator A.
Table 5.4 shows the results for the first strategy, This strategy assumes elevators A
and B grade and segregate the wheat received. However, elevator A pays producers prices
that differ according to the quality of wheat they deliver while elevator B pays producers
one price for all qualities ofwheat. Elevator A achieves a profit of $209, I02 while
elevator B achieves a profit of only $68,976. Elevator A receives more of the high quality
and middle quality wheat while elevator B attracts more of the low quality wheat. As with
the no competition structure, elevator A passes on to producers only 70% of the price
differential received from NIL buyers. Elevator A has a trade area radius of 31 miles for
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Figure 5.1
Structure 1: No Competition
Elevator Trade Area (Radius):
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Table 5.4
Structure 2: Strategy I, Results ofElevakr A &. B Maximizing Profits:
Competition (Elevators A &. B Don't Copy Each Other)
Elevator A Grades and Segregates (Pays Different Quality Prices)
Elevator B Grades and Segregates (pays One Average Price)
Prices Prices Paid Quantity
Elevator Quality by NIT.. Buyers to Producers Purchased from
(Radius) (S/bu.) ($/bu.) Producers (bu.) Profit
A High Quality (31) 5.00 4.81 670,845 $209,102
Middle Quality (23) 4.90 4.74 2,169,147
Low Quality (15) 4.80 4.67 441,614
B High Quality (9) 5.00 4.72 51.214 $68,976
Middle Quality (17) 4.90 4.72 1.183,285
Low Quality (25) 4.80 4.72 1,314,955
Table 5.5
Structure 2: Strategy 2, Results of Elevator A &. B Maximizing Profits:
Competition (Elevators A &. B Don't Copy Each Other)
Elevator A Grades and Segregates (pays Different Quality Prices)
Elevator B Does Not Grade or Segregate (pays One Average Price)
Prices Prices Paid Quantity
Elevator Quality by NIL Buyers to Producers Purchased from
(Radius) ($/bu.) (S/bu.) Producers (bu.) Profit
A High Quality (34) 5.00 4.80 805,271 $343,545
Middle Quality (26) 4.90 4.73 2,771,376
Low Quality (18) 4.80 4.66 640,308
B High Quality (6) 4.80 4.68 21,901 $27,485
Middle Quality (14) 4.80 4.68 802,541
Low Quality (22) 4.80 4.68 1,022,241
Table 5.6
Structure 2: Strategy 3, Results ofElevator A & B Maximizing Profits:
Competition (Elevators A & B Don't Copy Each Other)
Elevator A Grades and Segregates (pays One Average Price)
Elevator B Does Not Grade or Segregate (pays One Average Price)
Prices Prices Paid Quantity
Elevator Quality by NIL Buyers to Producers Purchased from
(Radius) ($/bu.) ($/bu.) Producers (bu.) Profit
A High Quality (24) 5.00 4.72 391,357 $274,164
Middle Quality (24) 4.90 4.72 2,348,140
Low Quality (24) 4.80 4.72 1,174,771
B High Quality (16) 4.80 4.69 176,209 $13,254
Middle Quality (16) 4.80 4.69 1,057,252
Low Quality (16) 4.80 4.69 529,093
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high quality, 23 miles for the middle quality, and 15 miles for the low quality wheat.
Elevator B has a trade area radius of9 miles for high quality, 17 miles for middle quality,
and 25 miles for low quality. Table 5.5 shows the results of the second strategy. This
strategy is where elevator A grades and segregates the wheat received, and also pays
producers prices that differ according to the quality ofwheat they deliver. Elevator B does
not grade the wheat received, nor does it segregate the wheat into different qualities or
pay different prices to producers for different qualities. This results in a profit of$343,545
for elevator A and $27,485 for elevator B. Elevator A receives even more ofthe high and
middle quality wheat while elevator B receives more ofthe low quality wheat. Again,
elevator A passes on to producers 70% of the price differential received from NIL buyers.
Elevator A has a trade area radius of 34 miles for high quality, 26 miles for middle quality,
and 18 miles for low quality wheat. Elevator B has a radius of 6 miles for high quality, 14
miles for middle quality, and 22 miles for low quality wheat. The results show that
elevators that grade correctly and pay different prices for different qualities of wheat can
substantially increase profits relative to its competitors that do not grade correctly and pay
different prices.
Table 5.6 shows the results of the third strategy. This strategy is where elevator A
grades and segregates the wheat received, but pays producers one price for all qualities of
wheat. Elevator B does not grade the wheat received, nor does it segregate the wheat into
different qualities or pay different prices to producers for different qualities. This results in
a profit of $274,164 for elevator A and $13,254 for elevator B. This strategy shows that it
can substantially increase profits by grading and segregating, even ifit pays producers one
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price for all qualities of wheat.
The results of the strategies under this competitive structure show that early
adopters that grade and segregate wheat, especially if they pay premiums for high quality
wheat and discounts for low quality wheat, can profit significantly compared to
competitors that either don't grade or grade but do not pay different prices. This is
because premiums and discounts induce farmers to bring in high quality wheat. However,
the full price differential from Nll.. buyers is not passed on to producers. For a 10 cent
price differential, only 7 cents of it is passed on to producers. Figure 5.2 sbow~ the
different trade areas for each elevator under the three different strategies.
Competition (Elevators Copy Each Other)
For this competitive structure scenario, elevator A has six competitors located
around it, 40 miles away. Elevator A is assumed to be the leader in grading/pricing
strategies, and elevator B is assumed to represent the competitors that fonow, copying
elevator A's grading/pricing strategy.
Tables 5.7,5.8, and 5.9 show the results of the three different strategies for this
scenario. For each of the three strategies, elevators A and B achieve the same profits, pay
the same prices, and purchase the same quantity ofeach of the three qualities ofwheat.
Table 5.7 shows the results of the first strategy. In this model, elevators A and B grade
and segregate the wheat received, and also pay producers prices that differ according to
the quality of wheat they deliver. Since the elevators are copying each other, the elevators
pay the same prices and have the same trade areas for all qualities. The trade areas for
elevators A and B are 20 miles (half the distance between the two elevators) for all
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Figure 5.2
Structure 2: Competition (Elevators A & B Don't Copy Each Other),
Elevator Trade Areas (Radius):
Strategy 1: Elevator A Grades and Segregates (pays Different Quality Prices)
Elevator B Grades and Segregates (pays One Average Price)
Strategy 2: Elevator A Grades and Segregates (pays Different Quality Prices)
Elevator B Does Not Grade or Segregate (pays One Average Price)
Strategy 3: Elevator A Grades and Segregates (pays One Average Price)
Elevator B Does Not Grade or Segregate (pays One Average Price)
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Table 5.7
Structure 3: Strategy I, Results ofElevator A & B Maximizing Profits:
Competition (Elevators A & B Copy Each Other)
Elevators A & B Grade and Segregate (Pay Different Quality Prices)
Elevator
A
Quality
(Radius)
High Quality (20)
Middle Quality (20)
Low Quality (20)
Prices Prices Paid Quantity
by Nil.. Buyers to Producers Purchased from
($lbu.) ($lbu.) Producers (bu.)
5.00 4.85 273,193
4.90 4.75 1,639,157
4.80 4.65 820,156
Profit
$118,032
Table 5.8
Structure 3: Strategy 2, Results ofElevator A & B Maximizing Profits:
Competition (Elevators A & B Copy Each Other)
Elevators A & B Grade and Segregate (pay One Average Price)
B High Quality (20) 5.00
Middle Quality (20) 4.90
Low Quality (20) 4.80
4.85
4.75
4.65
273,193
1,639,157
820,156
S118,032
Elevator
A
Quality
(Radius)
High Quality (20)
Middle Quality (20)
Low Quality (20)
Prices Prices Paid Quantity
by NIL Buyers to Producers Purchased from
($/bu.) ($/bu.) Producers (bu.)
5.00 4.73 273,193
4.90 4.73 1,639,157
4.80 4.73 820,156
Profit
$117,983
B High Quality (20) 5.00
Middle Quality (20) 4.90
Low Quality (20) 4.80
4.73
4.73
4.73
273,193
1,639,157
820,156
$117,983
Table 5.9
Structure 3: Strategy 3, Results ofElevator A & B Maximizing Profits:
Competition (Elevators A & B Copy Each Other)
Elevators A & B Do Not Grade or Segregate (pay One Average Price)
Elevator
A
Quality
(Radius)
High Quality (20)
Middle Quality (20)
Low Quality (20)
Prices Prices Paid Quantity
by NIL Buyers to Producers Purchased from
(Slbu.) ($lbu.) Producers (bu.)
4.80 4.67 273,193
4.80 4.67 1,639,157
4.80 4.67 820,161
Profit
$118,639
B High Quality (20) 4.80
Middle Quality (20) 4.80
Low Quality (20) 4.80
4.67
4.67
4.67
70
273,193
1,639,157
820,161
$118,639
qualities, since they are pricing the same. They pay prices ofS4.85, $4.75, and S4.65 for
the different qualities. When all elevators are grading and pricing the same, then elevators
pass on the full price differentials received from Nll.. buyers for the different qualities. The
profit for each elevator is $118,032.
Table 5.8 shows the results of the second strategy. This strategy assumes elevators
A and B grade the wheat received and segregate it to receive prices from Nll.. buyers that
are adjusted for quality, but they pay producers one price for all qualities ofwheat. The
trade area for each elevator is 20 miles. The price paid to producers is $4.73 for all
qualities. The profit for both elevators is $117,983, which is slightly lower than in the first
strategy.
Table 5.9 shows the results of the third strategy. This strategy assumes elevators A
and B do not grade the wheat received, nor do they segregate the wheat into different
qualities or pay different prices to producers for different qualities. The profit for both
elevators is $118,639 which is slightly higher than profits under strategies 1 and 2. But,
both elevators pay a price of $4.67 for all qualities, which is lower than the price paid
under strategy 2.
All three strategies for this scenario result in similar profits. The trade areas of
elevator A and B are 20 miles for all qualities because the competitors are following
elevator A's grading/pricing strategy. Figure 5.3 shows the trade areas ofelevators A and
B for each strategy under this competitive structure.
One important result under this structure is that elevators A and B are able to pass
on full price differentials to producers when they are grading and segregating the wheat
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Figure 5.3
Structure 3: Competition (Elevators A & B Copy Each Other)
Elevator Trade Areas (Radius):
Strategy 1: Elevators A & B Grade and Segregate (pay Different Quality Prices)
Strategy 2: Elevators A & B Grade and Segregate (pay One Average Price)
Strategy 3: Elevators A & B Do Not Grade or Segregate (pay One Average Price)
Elevators A & B Copy Each Other I
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received, and paying producers prices that differ according to the quality ofwheat they
deliver. This means that the country elevators would not absorb any of the price
differentials from NlL buyers. The results found that the profits varied little by strategy
under this structure. This means that an elevator has very little incentive to invest in
proper grading equipment and additional labor to grade because there is little increase in
profits ifother elevators copy the innovator's grading/pricing strategy. Ifall elevators
adopt grading and pricing practices that reflect the true value of all qualities, elevators
might find it more profitable in the long run to pass on price differentials for the different
qualities because ofNU., buyers tightening grain grading standards year by year. It would
also improve the wheat industry and the quality of wheat in the United States because
farmers would be given incentives to improve their quality ofwheat if all elevators passed
on price differentials for the different qualities.
Simulation Analysis Summary
The results show that "early adopters" that grade and segregate the wheat
received, and pay producers prices that differ according to the quality of wheat they
deliver, can achieve substantial profits ifits competitors are paying just one price for all
qualities ofwheat. However, only 70% of the price differential would be passed on to
producers. The early adopters accomplish this by attracting more of the high and middle
quality wheat.
If other elevators copy the early adopters, profits drop back to the level achieved
when none of the elevators graded and priced accordingly. However, by grading,
segregating, and paying producers different prices for different qualities, producers receive
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the full value of the grain they deliver. Producers delivering high quality grain do not
subsidize those delivering low quality grain. To the extent wheat quality is affected by
cultural and harvesting practices, elevators paying higher prices for higher quality wheat
can increase the overall quality ofwheat produced.
Sensitivity Analysis
The sensitivity analysis results are discussed below and these results used a range
of parameters that reflects the range of conditions observed in the 1995, 1996, and 1997
harvest. The price differentials for each quality are varied to show prices paid by NIL
buyers for each year. Also, production densities are changed to represent different
amounts ofwheat harvested for the different years. Relative quality densities are also
varied to show different proportions of high quality, middle quality, and low quality wheat.
These results provide perspective answers for the 1995, 1996, and 1997 harvest years on
how elevators should have graded and priced wheat on the basis of test weight, dockage,
and SBK.
Various Price Differentials
First, price differentials were varied by 2-cent increments from SO.00 to SO. 10 per
bushel while holding production density constant at 2,174 bu./mi2, and quality densities
constant at 10% high quality, 60% middle quality, and 30% low quality. Appendix tables
B.1 - B.9 show the results for each structure.
Appendix tables B.1 - B.3 show the results under structure one when varying price
differentials. The simulations with no competition show the most profitable strategy is
when elevator A grades and segregates the wheat received, and also pays producers prices
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that differ according to the Quality of wheat they deliver. However, when price
differentials for the various Quality levels are two cents or less, the most profitable strategy
is when elevator A does not grade the wheat received. If there is little price differential
between the qualities by Nll. buyers, there is no reason to grade and segregate because of
the increased cost. However, in all recent years, the price differentials for at least one
quality characteristic has been more than two cents, suggesting that in the current
marketing environment, grading would be profitable.
Under the second structure where elevator A has competitors that fonnulates their
grading/pricing strategies independently of elevator A, results were similar. Appendix
tables B.4 - B.6 show the results of the second structure when varying price differentials.
Elevator A's profits are higher than elevator B's when elevator A grades and segregates
the wheat received, and pays producers different prices for different qualities of wheat,
while at the same time elevator B pays producers only one price for all qualities of wheat.
However, when the price differential is 2 cents or lower, elevator B's profits are higher. If
there is a small price differential between qualities, there is little incentive for elevators to
invest in grading equipment and labor. It would be more profitable for an elevator to not
grade and segregate, and pay one price for all qualities if the price differentials from NIL
buyers are 2 cents or less.
When price differentials are greater than 2 cents, elevator A maximizes profits by
grading and segregating and passing on approximately 65% to 700.10 of the price
differential to producers. Elevator A achieves substantially higher profits than its
competitors when they pay only one price for all qualities. This is because such a strategy
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could cause elevator A to attract more of the high and middle quality grain while its
competitors are left with most of the lower quality wheat.
Figure 5.4 shows trade area and prices paid to producers by elevators A and B
under structure 2 and strategy 2. This is where elevator A grades and segregates the wheat
received, and pays producers prices that differ according to the quality ofwheat they
deliver. Elevator B does not grade the wheat received, nor does it segregate the wheat
into different qualities or pay different prices to producers for different qualities. It shows
that elevator A receives more of the high and middle quality wheat when the price
differentials are more than 2 cents. As price differentials increase, elevator B receives
more of the low quality wheat resulting in a lower average price paid to producers. This is
because elevator B receives a lower average price from Nil.. buyers. Figure 5.5 shows the
trade area and profits by elevators A and B under this same strategy. Profits are higher for
elevator B when the price differentials are less than two cents (because elevator A pays
grading and segregating cost and elevator B does not). However, profits are higher for
elevator A when the price differential between qualities is greater than two cents.
The third structure where elevator A has competitors that copy its grading/pricing
strategy produced results similar to those above. Appendix tables B.7 -B.9 show results
under the third structure when varying price differentials. If both elevators A and B grade
and segregate, and pay producers different quality prices, they pass on 100% of the NIL
buyer price differentials to producers. No matter what grading/pricing strategy elevator A
chooses, however, as long as B copies A the elevators achieve similar profits. While there
is little profit incentive for Elevator A to grade correctly and pass on premiums and
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Figure 5.4
(Trade Area & Prices)
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discounts to producers if it knows that elevator B will copy it, producers would benefit
from such a choice. Also, such a choice could increase quality ofU.S. wheat to the extent
producers are able to respond to the price differentials for higher quality wheat.
These results suggest that elevators will find it profitable to pass on different price
differentials to producers when the price differentials are greater than 2 cents. Early
adopters will maximize profits by passing on 700.10 of the Nll.. price differential to
producers. When all elevators begin grading correctly and paying different prices for
different qualities, then all elevators will maximize profits by passing on the full Nil.. price
differential to producers.
Varlous Production Densities
The second part of sensitivity analysis varies production density while holding the
price differentials and quality levels constant. The production densities considered were
1000,2174, and 4000 bushels per square mile.. The price differentials were held constant
at 10 cents, quality proportions were held at 10% high quality, 60% middle quality, and
30% low quality. Appendix Tables B,10 - B.18 show the results of each structure as
production density is varied.
Appendix tables B.I0 - B.12 show the results ofvarying production density when
there is no competition. The prices paid to producers stay the same regardless of the
production density production density for each strategy. The most profitable strategy is
when elevator A grades and segregates the wheat received, and pays producers prices that
differ according to the quality ofwheat they deliver.
Appendix tables B. 13 - B.15 show the results under second structure, where
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elevator B does not follow elevator A's grading/pricing strategy. The results show that
elevator A achieves substantial profits when it grades and segregates, and pays different
prices for different qualities while its competitors pays one price for all qualities. In this
case, elevator A passes on approximately 65% to 70% ofthe price differential to the
producers.
Appendix tables B. 16 - B.18 show the results when varying production densities
under the structure where elevator B copies elevator A's grading and pricing strategies.
The profits are similar for each of these strategies, no matter how elevators A and B grade
and priced wheat. When elevators A and B grade and segregate wheat, and pay producers
different prices for each quality, they pass on 100% ofthe price differential to the
producers.
Various Quality Levels
The third part of the sensitivity analysis varies relative proportions of each quality
while the price differential and production densities are held constant. The relative
proportion of each quality are varied from quality levels: 10% high quality, 60% middle
quality, and 30% low quality to 30% high quality, 40% middle quality, and 30% low
quality to 50% high quality, 20% middle quality, and 30% low quality wheat. The price
differential was held constant at 10 cents, and the production density was held constant at
2,174 bushels per square mile. Appendix Tables B.19 - B.27 show the results of each
strategy under each structure.
Appendix tables R19 - B.21 show the results of the no competition structure when
varying the quality proportions. The most profitable strategy, as before, is when elevator
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A grades and segregates the wheat received, and pays producers prices that differ
according to the quality of wheat they deliver.
Appendix tables B.22 - B.24 show the results when varying the quality proportions
under the structure where elevator B does not copy elevator A's grading and pricing
strategies. Elevator A achieves substantial profits when it grades and segregates the
wheat, and pays producers prices that differ according to the quality of wheat they deliver,
while its competitors pay producers one price for aU qualities ofwheat. Elevator A passes
on approximately 65% to 70% ofthe price differential to the producers. This implies that
elevators that begin to tighten grading standards can profit significantly if their
competitors continue to pay just one price for all qualities. This is because these elevators
will attract more ofthe high and middle quality grain, while competitors get most of the
poor quality wheat. As the relative proportion of high quality wheat increases relative to
middle and low quality wheat in the elevator's trade area, the profits of elevator A
increases relative to those of its competitors.
Appendix tables B.25 - B.27 show results under the third structure, where elevator
B copies elevator A's grading and pricing strategies. Ifboth elevators pay different prices
for each quality, they pass on 100% of the NIL buyer price differential to producers.
However, the profits under this structure change little across strategies. Therefore, there is
little incentive for elevators to grade if all competing elevators are doing the same.
Sensitivity Analysis Summary
The results of the sensitivity analysis show that the first elevators to begin grading
correctly achieve substantial profits when they pass on 70010 of the NIL price differential
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to producers, as long as the price differentials is greater than two cents. When all elevators
begin grading correctly, they have incentive to pass on to producers the full amount of the
Na buyer price differentials.
1995. 1996. and 1997 Harvest
Appendix tables A.7 - A.9 shows the quality distributions for test weight, dockage,
and SBK during the 1995, 1996, and 1997 Oklahoma wheat harvests. The tables also
show the actual discounts that were implemented during the 1995, 1996, and 1997 wheat
harvests. For all three years, the price differentials for test weight and dockage were
compared to the price differentials for SBK. This is because in each ofthe years the wheat
had a low level of SBK.
The results show that a country elevator should have graded and segregated for
test weight and dockage, and paid producers 70% ofthe price differential received by NIL
buyers if its competitors were paying producers one price for all qualities. However, it
would not have been profitable to grade and segregate for SBK since the price
differentials for SBK were so small.
Summary
The results from the simulation and sensitivity analysis found that a country
elevator can increase profits significantly by grading and segregating the wheat received,
and paying producers prices that differ according to the quality ofwheat they deliver, ifits
competitors are paying producers one price for all qualities of wheat. These early adopters
would pass on to producers 70% of the price differentials. The results show that the
higher the price differential by Na buyers, the higher the profits that can be made by
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elevators that grade correctly and pay producers quality-adjusted prices. However, if NIL
buyer price differentials are two cents or less, elevators would not achieve higher profits.
When all elevators grade and pass on price differentials, they pass on to producers
the full amount of the price differential. The drawback is elevator profits are not increased.
However, producers of high and middle quality wheat benefit from higher prices, while
producers oflow quality receive a lower price. To the extent producers can control wheat
quality, this would increase the overall quality ofwheat entering the marketing system.
Chapter 6 summarizes the results, and suggests implications of the results for the
wheat industry. Finally, it suggests further work that can improve upon this study.
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Chapter VI
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Summary
A simulation analysis identifies optimal wheat grading and pricing strategies for
country elevators under three possible competitive structures. The three different
competitive structures are: 1) an elevator is a perfect monopsony, with no competition in
its potential trade area; 2) an elevator has competitors that do not follow its lead in
formulating a grading and pricing strategy, and 3) an elevator has competitors that copy
its grading/pricing strategy exactly. For each structure, an elevator and its competitors
consider three possible grading and pricing strategies: 1) an elevator grades and segregates
the wheat delivered, and also pays producers prices that differ according to the quality of
wheat they deliver; 2) an elevator grades the wheat received and segregates it to receive
prices from NIL buyers that are adjusted for quality, but pays producers one price for all
qualities of wheat; and 3) an elevator does not grade the wheat received, nor does it
segregate the wheat into different qualities or pay different prices to producers for
different qualities.
A sensitivity analysis identifies the optimal strategies over a range of reasonably
likely operating environments, consistent with the range of conditions observed during the
1995, 1996, and 1997 harvests.
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The results show country elevators facing no competition or competitors who did
not copy should have graded and segregated, and paid producers different prices for
different qualities on the basis of test weight and dockage for the 1995, 1996, and 1997
wheat harvests. The price differentials were large enough for elevators to profit by passing
on to producers 70 % of the differential received from NIL buyers. However, the price
differentials were not large enough for shrunken and broken kernels (SBK). Therefore,
country elevators would not have profited by grading and segregating, and paying
producers different quality prices on the basis of SBK. There were low percentages of
SBK for the 1995, 1996, and 1997 harvests.
However, for elevators with competitors that copy their grading/pricing strategies,
grading and paying producers different prices for different qualities would neither increase
nor decrease profits compared to not grading. However, if the elevators chose to grade,
and pay quality-related prices, they would pass on most or all of the price differential
received from NIL buyers. This could potentially raise the quality ofUS. wheat.
The results from the simulation and sensitivity analysis showed that a country
elevator can profit from paying producers quality-related prices if price differentials
received from NIL buyers are greater than two cents. Since NIL buyers have begun to
charge larger discounts for specific quality characteristics, the price differentials are
usually greater than 2 cents for the most important quality characteristics. Therefore, early
adopters can be expected to pass on 70% of price differentials. The results show that the
higher the price differential from NIL buyers, the higher the profits that can be made by an
elevator that grades correctly and passes on the price differential to producers, if its
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competitors do not follow suit.
However, ifcompetitors follow suit, there is no increase in profits by grading and
segregating the wheat received, and paying producers different prices for different
qualities. However, producers ofhigh and middle quality wheat benefit from higher prices,
while producers oflow quality wheat receive a lower price. To the extent producers can
control wheat quality, this would increase the overall quality ofwheat entering the
marketing system. The results changed little when varying the overall production density
and quality proportions in an elevator's trade area.
The results are consistent with Hill's assertion that market prices should convey
information about the quality of the grains and should provide incentives for improving
quality. Hill argues that grain quality would be improved if participants were rewarded for
improving quality and value. Producers could improve quality ofwheat they deliver
through weed control, time of sowing, wheat variety, and tillage methods. By eliminating
incentives for diminishing value, quality-adjusted prices would increase the overall quality
of U.S. wheat. This could increase the u.s. market share ofworld wheat exports because
of increased demand by importing countries..
Importance ofStudy
This research is important to the whole wheat industry of the United States.
Kenkel, Anderson, and Attaway found that country elevators in Oklahoma were not
grading and pricing wheat based on quality. Producers supplying high quality wheat were
not being rewarded.
The results here show that an early adopter of the practice ofgrading and paying
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different prices to producers can increase profit significantly by increasing its trade area
for high quality wheat. As other country elevators adopt the practice, producers would
have increased incentives to improve the quality ofwheat.
Ifcountry elevators don't begin grading and paying prices based on quality, it
could be hannful for the US. wheat industry. This is because countries with the reputation
of high quality wheat such as Canada and Australia will continue to increase their share of
world wheat exports while US. market share contmues to decrease. As Johnson and King
note, most of the grain in traditional market channels passes through country elevators, so
prices set by country elevators for wheat ofvarious qualities provide important signals
from world markets to producers. Also, as consumers increasingly demand differentiated
products, a market pricing system that does not adequately reward quality may lead to
increased alliances and vertical integration. These may introduce inefficiencies of their
own. Therefore, this author recommends to the USDA and Federal Grain Inspection
Service that it consider ways to encourage elevators to grade correctly and pass on to
producers quality-related price differentials received from Nll.. buyers. Such action should
increase overall quality ofUS. wheat, and might remove part of the incentive for
increased contracting and vertical integration in the industry.
In the long run, profits would not be increased by elevators for doing this, nor
would they be reduced. If this is done, it would adequately transmit correct price signals
to producers and give them incentives to improve quality.
Needfor Further Study
The models used in chapter 4 ignore optimal blending activities by elevators. They
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only consider segregation strategies. Therefore, blending activities by country elevators
need to be incorporated into the models to expand on this research. This likely would
increase profits even further for an elevator that grades, segregates, and blends the wheat
received, and pays producers prices that differ according to the quality ofwheat they
deliver, particularly if its competitors are not grading, segregating, and blending wheat.
Prospect theory was discussed in chapter 3. Prospect theory suggests farmers
value discounts differently than premiums, so that a discount decreases utility more than a
premium ofthe same magnitude increases it. Further work needs to incorporate prospect
theory in to the mathematical models to assess its impact.
The model assumes a linear cost structure for an elevator's operating activities.
Other nonlinear cost structures that incorporate economies of size and effects of capacity
constraints may alter these results.
Finally, research is needed to determine the amount of incentive producers, plant
breeders, and others need to improve overall wheat quality. More information is needed to
determine the extent to which quality can be improved through variety selection and
cultural and harvesting practices, and the extent to which quality is determined by random
factors such as weather.
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Appendix Table A.l
1995 Wheat Quality Harvest Data Distribution
<=1 1226 93.3%
#1 112 8.5%
#3 300 29.7%
tr2 526 40.2%
21-3 14 1.1%
3.1-4 10 0.8%
1.1-2 36 29%
<=29 866 65.9%
62-62.9 3, 0.2% 3-3.5 26 2.0'l6
• I 61-61.9 24 1.8% 3.6-3.9 16 1.2%
~.9 100 7.6% 4-4.5 23 1.54l'
59-59.9 247 16.8% . 4.6-4.9 15 1.1%
56-56.9 311 23.7% 5.Q.5.5 23 1.8%
'Sl-'Sl.9 224 17.0% 5.~.9 'ZT 21%
56-56.9 176 13.4% 6-6.5 2B 21%
,55-55.9 110 6.4% 6.6-6.9 16 1.2%
54-54.9 53 4.0'l6 7-7.5 25 1.9%
53-53.9 30 23% 7.6-7.9 20 1.5'"
52-52.9 13 1.0% ~.9 2B 21%
51-51.9 12 0.9% ~9.9 34 26%
50-50.9 6 0.5% 10-10.9 22 1.7%
<50 5 0.4% 11-11.9 14 1.1%
Avg. 1314 17.7 12-13 19 1.4%
>13 112 6.5%
Avg. 1314 4.0%
<=7 1266 96.3%
7.1-8.0 20 1.5%
8.1-9 5 0.4%
9.1-10 7 0.5%
10.1-11 3 0.2%
11.1·12 2 0.2%
12.1-13 3 0.2%
13.1-14 3 0.2%
14.1-15 0 0.0'l6
>15 5 0.4%
Avg. 1314 2.8%
.. '.ift~~~ ~~~___i
<14 1186 90.3%
14-14.5 65 4.9%
14.6-15 22 1.7%
15.1-15.5 16 1.2%
15.6-16 6 0.5%
15.1-16.5 7 0.5%
16.6-17 8 0.6%
>17 4 0.3%
Avg. 1314 12.1%
5.1-6 4 0.3% tI4 187 14.2%
#5 68 5.2%
<=1.4 747 56.8%
1.>1.9 172 13.1%
2-2.4 127 9.7%
2>2.9 91 6.9%
3-3.4 51 3.9%
3.>3.9 44 3.3%
4-4.4 27 21%
4.5-4.9 18 1.4%
5.Q.5.9 16 1.2%
6.0-8.9 10 0.6%
7.D-7.9 6 0.5%
6.0-8.9 1 0.1%
9.D-9.9 2 0.2%
>=10 2 0.2%
Avg. 1314 1.7%
7.1-8 2 0.2%
>8 11 0.8%
Avg. 1314 0.6%
~'P:f._.~r:m .:",.:: '-':":': :,.tM~~1
>='16 3 0.2%
1>15.9 22 1.7%
14-14.9 115 8.B%
13-13.9 307 23.4%
12-12.9 427 32.5%
11·11.9 305 23.2%
10-10.9 111 8.4%
9.D-9.9 22 1.7%
8.0-8.9 2 0.2%
<8.0 0 0.0%
Avg 1314 12.6%
SG 29 22%
Ava. 1314 2.7
<=1.4 1257 95.7%
1.>1.9 14 1.1%
2-2.4 10 D.S%
25-2.9 12 0.9%
3.0-3.4 7 0.5%
3.5-3.9 2 0.2%
4.0-4.4 0 0.0%
4.5-4.9 1 0.1 %
5.0-5.9 4 0.3%
>6 7 0.5%
Avg. 1314 0.4%
Source: Calculated from data in Kenkel, Anderson, and Attaway
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Appendix Table A.2
1996 Wheat Quality Halvest Data Distribution
t1 215 15.7%
3.1-4
4.1-5
5.1-6
6.1-7
7.1-8
8.1-9
9.1-10
10.1-11
11.1-12
12.1-13
13.1-14
>14
A .
11.3%
4.0%
1.8%
0.3%
0.5%
0.1%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
~ 225 16.5%
$59.9 221 16.2%
58-58.9 200 14.6%
57.5-57.9 101 7.4%
57-57.4 86 6.3%
56.5-56.9 75 5.5%
56-56.4 112 8.2%
55.5-55.9 f5T 6.4%
55-55.4 ~ 5.9%
54.5-54.9 55 4.0%
54-54.4 40 2.~
<54 84 6.1%
Avg. 1366 57.60
1-2
2.1-3
3.1-4
4.1-5
5.1-6
6.1-7
7.1-8
8.1-9
9.1-10
>10.1
A .
64.1%
27.5%
4.8%
1.6%
0.7%
0.5'"
0.1'"
0.2'll>
0.4'"
0.1%
0.1%
1.11%
14 261 19.1%
S.G. 11 0.8%
#12 425 31.1%
97.88%<.5 1337
#13 373 27.3%
tIS 81 5.9%
Avg. 1366 2.71
6.1-7 0 0.0%
5.1-6 0 0.0%
4.1-5 0 0.0%
3.1-4 0 0.0%
9.1-10 0 0.0%
2.1-3 0 0.0%
7.1-8 0 0.0%
1.1-2 2 0.1%
8.1-9 0 0.0%
t~~ii~~'::~~gj::
<=1 1364 99.9%MiWitJ.: :.nJilK:' 'P.trCtiiI.tff
<14 1111 81.3%
14-14.5 120 8.8%
14.6-15 51 3.7%
15.1-15.5 30 2.2%
15.6-16 Z3 1.7%
16.1-16.5 18 1.3%
16.6-17 2 0.1% I
>17 11 0.8%
Ayg. 1386 12.8"1.
>10 0 0.0% .5-.7 14 1.02%
<3
3-3.9
4-4.9
5-5.9
6-6.9
7-7.9
8-8.9
8-9.9
10-10.9
11-11.9
>12
A •
Avg. 1388 0.1%
0.4%
6.4%
20.9%
34.7%
20.4%
11.3%
4.0%
1.4%
0.2%
14..2"/1
.8-1 6
1.1·1.3 0
1.4-2 4
2.1-2.5 1
2.6-3 1
3.1-3.5 2
3.6-4.0 1
4.1-4.5 0
>4.6 0
Avg. 1388
0.44%
0.00%
0.29%
0.07%
0.07%
0.15%
0.07%
0.00%
0.00%
Source: Calculated from data in Kenkel, Anderson, and Attaway
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Appendix Table A.3
1997 Wheat Quality Harvest Data Distribution
t.~I11III_
<=3 1102 88.1%
3.1-4 105 6.4%
4.1-5 26 2.1%
5.1-6 9 0.7%
6.1-7 3 0.2%
7.1-a 3 0.2%
9.1-10 2 0.2%
10.1-11 0 0.0%
11.1-12 0 0.0%
121-13 0 0.0%
13.1-14 0 0.0%
>14 0 0.0%
>=60 475
59-59.9 212
58-56.9 236
57.5-57.9 92
57-57.4 61
56.5-56.9 47
56-56.4 47
55.5-55.9 26
55-55.4 16
54.5-54.9 11
54-54.4 5
<54 19
A~. 1251
16.9%
19.0%
7.4%
4.9%
3.8%
3.8%
2.1%
1.4'16
0.9%
0.4'16
1.5'16
59.20
<=.5
.6-1
1.1-2
2.1-3
3.1-4
4.1-5
5.1-6
6.1-7
7.1-8
8.1-9
9.1·10
>10.1
A .
470
395
254
55
16
17
11
12
6
5
9
1261
31.6%
20.3%
4.4'16
1.JC16
1.4%
0.9%
1.0%
0.5%
0.4%
0.1%
0.7%
1.2%
Avo. 1251 1.9%
.~: :sarilS1ftj:: bJlllii
<=13.5 966 77.2$
13.6-13.7 37 3.0%
13.8-14 55 4.4%
14.1-14.2 40 3.2%
14.3-14.5 39 3.1%
14.6-14.7 22 1.6%
14.8-15 21 1.7%
15.1-16 53 4.2%
16.1-17.0 11 0.9%
, 17.1-16 5 0.4%
16.1-19 2 0.2%
Avg. 1251 12.6%
1.1-2
2.1-3
3.1-4
4.1-5
5.1-6
6.1-7
7.1-8
8.1-9
9.1-10
>10
A~.
.: .t:: :.;:
96.4%
2.5'16
0.3%
0.3%
0.2%
0.2%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.1%
0.0%
0.3%
,m~_mUij_~Wl\.~
'1 452 36.1%
#2 449 35.9%
#3 254 20.3%
#4 70 5.6%
15 15 1.2%
S.G. 11 0.9%
Avg. 12512.02
'.11 Wf.f@1t1$~~ W@w[tJ4$U
<.5 1174 93.8'16
.5-.7 37 3.0%
.8-1 12 1.0%
Ilrlllllll~ li:~::::l:::I;;:[::~;
<3 1190 95.1 %
3.1-4 46 3.7%
4.1-5 10 0.6%
5.1-6 2 0.2%
6.1-7 2 0.2%
7.1-6 0 0.0%
6.1-9 0 0.0%
9.1-10 1 0.1%
10.1-11 0 0.0%
11.1-12 0 0.0%
>12 0 0.0%
Ava. 1251 1.4%
rf't~l..mr_'J!..""iIii
>=18 0 0.0%
17-17.9 0 0.0%
16-16.9 2 0.2%
15-15.9 6 0.6%
14-14.9 32 2.6%
13-13.9 164 13.1%
12-12.9 400 32.0%
11-11.9 419 33.5%
10-10.9 191 15.3'16
9.D-9.9 29 2.3%
, 8.D-e.9 6 0.5%
A~. 1251 11.9%
1.1-1.3 9 0.7%
1.4-2 9 0.7%
2.1-2.5 2 0.2%
2.6-3 2 0.2%
3.1-3.5 3 0.2%
3.6-4.0 0 0.0%
~1~ 1 Q1%
>5 2 0.2%
Avg. 1261 0.2%
Source: Calculated from data in Kenkel, Anderson, and Attaway
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Appendix Table A4
Discount Schedule from NIL Buyers for the 1995 Wheat Harvest (CentsIBushel)
Dockage
~2.9=O
3.0-3.5 =2
3.6-3.9=4
4.0-4.5 = 6
4.6-4.9 = 8
5.0-5.5 = 10
5.6-5.9 = 12
6.0-6.5 = 14
6.6-6.9 = 16
7.0-7.5 = 18
7.6-7.9 = 20
8.0-8.9 =22
9.0-9.9 = 26
10.0-10.9 = 30
11.0-11.9 = 34
12.0-13.0 = 38
>13.0=42
Shrunken &Broken
~ 1.4 = 0
1.5-1.9 = 0.5
2.0-2.4 = 1.0
2.5-2.9 = 1.5
3.0-3.4 = 2.0
3.5-3.9 = 2.5
4.0-4.4 = 3.0
4.5-4.9 = 3.5
5.0-5.9= 4.5
6.0-6.9 = 5.5
7.0-7.9 = 6.5
8.0-8.9 = 7.5
9.0-9.9 = 8.5
~ 10.0 = 9.5
Test Weight
~64#= 0
63#-63.9 =.5
62#-62.9 = 1.5
61#-61.9 = 3.5
60#-60.9 = 5.5
59#-59.9 = 7.5
58#-58.9 = 9.5
57#-57.9 = 11.5
56#-56.9 = 13.5
55#-55.9 = 15.5
54#-54.9 = 17.5
53#-53.9 = 20.5
52#-52.9 = 26.5
51#-51.9 = 32.5
50#-50.9 = 38.5
<50#= 44.5
Moisture
<14=0
14.0-14.5 = 3
14.6-15.0 = 6
15.1-15.5 = 9
15.6-16.0 = 12
16.1-16.5 = 15
16.6-17.0 = 18
>17.0=21
Foreign Material
~1.4 =0
1.5-1.9 = 1
2.0-2.4 = 2
2.5-2.9 = 3
3.0-3.4 = 4
3.5-3.9= 5
4.0-4.4 = 6
4.5-4.9 = 7
5.0-5.9 = 8
~6 = 10
Damage
~2=0
2.1-3 = 1
3.1-4.0 = 2
4.1-5.0 = 3
5.1-6.0 = 5
6.1-7.0 = 7
7.1-8.0 = 9
8.1-9.0 = 11
9.1-10.0 = 13
>10 = 16
Total Defects
~7=0
7.1-8.0 = 1
8.1-9.0 =2
9.1-10.0 = 3
10.1-11.0=4
11.1-12.0 = 5
12.1-13.0 = 6
13.1-14.0 = 7
14.1-15.0 = 8
>15 = 10
Source: Kenkel. Anderson, and Attaway
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Appendix Table A5
Discount Schedule from NIL Buyers for the 1996 Wheat Harvest (CentsIBushel)
Dockage
.s:.9=O
1.0-2.0 = 2
2.1-3.0 =4
3.1-4.0=6
4.1-5.0 = 8
5.1-6.0 = 12
6.1~7.0 = 16
7.1-8.0 = 20
8.1-9.0 = 24
9.1-10.0 = 28
>10.1 =32
Shrunken &Broken
<3.0 = 0
3.0-3.9 = .5
4.0-4.9 = 1
5.0-5.9 = 3
6.0-6.9= 5
7.0-7.9 =7
8.0-8.9 = 9
9.0-9.9 = 10
10.0-10.9 = 11
11.0-11.9 = 13
~12.0= 15
Test Weight
~6O#=0
59.0#-59.9 = .5
58.0#-58.9 = 1
57.5#-57.9 = 2
57.0#-57.4 = 4
56.5#-56.9 = 6
56.0#-56.4 = 8
55.5#-55.9 = 10
55.0#-55.4 = 12
54.5#-54.9 = 15
54.0#-54.4 = 18
<54#= 24
Moisture
<14=0
14.0-14.5 = 3
14.6-15.0 = 6
15.0-15.5 = 9
15.6-16.0 = 12
16.0-16.5 = 15
16.6-17.0 = 18
>17.0 = 21
Foreign Material
<0.5 = 0
0.5-0.7 =.5
0.8-1.0 = 3
1.1-1.3 = 5
1.4-2.0 = 6
2.1-2.5 = 7
2.6-3.0 = 8
3.1-3.5 = 9
3.6-4.0 = 10
4.1-4.5 = 11
~4.6 = 12
Damage
.s:2.0=0
2.1-3.0 = 1
3.1-4.0 = 2
4.1-5.0 = 3
5.1-6.0 = 5
6.1-7.0=7
7.1-8.0 = 9
8.1-9.0 = 11
9.1-10.0 = 13
>10 = 16
Total Defects
.s:3=O
3.1-4.0 = .5
4.1-5.0 = 1
5.1-6.0 = 3
6.1-7.0=5
7.1-8.0 = 7
8.1-9.0 = 9
9.1-10.0 = 11
10.1-11.0 =14
11.1-12.0=17
12.1-13.0 =20
13.1-14.0 =23
>14 = 26
Source: Kenkel, Anderson, and Attaway
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Appendix Table A.6
Discount Schedule from NIL Buyers for the 1997 Wheat H8lVest (CentslBushel)
Dockage
~1 = 0
1.1-2.0 = 2
2.1-3.0 = 3
3.1-4.0=5
4.1-5.0 = 7
5.1-6.0 = 11
6.1-7.0=15
7.1-8.0 = 19
8.1-9.0 = 23
9.1-10.0 = 27
>10.0 =31
Shrunken &Broken
~3.0 = 0
3.1-4.0 = .5
4.1-5.0 = 1
5.1-6.0 = 3
6.1-7.0=5
7.0-8.0=7
8.1-9.0=9
9.1-10.0 = 10
10.1-11.0= 11
11.1-12.0 = 12
>12.0 = 13
Test Weight
~60#= 0
59.0#-59.9 = .5
58.0#-58.9 = 1
57.5#-57.9 = 2
57.0#-57.4 = 4
56.5#-56.9 = 6
56.0#-56.4 = 8
55.5#-55.9 = 10
55.0#-55.4 = 12
54.5#-54.9 = 15
54.0#-54.4 = 18
<54# =24
Moisture
~13.5=O
13.6-13.7 = 2
13.8-14.0=4
14.1-14.2 = 6
14.3-14.5 = 12
14.6-14.7 = 10
14.8-15.0 = 12
15.1-16.0 = 20
16.1-17.0 = 28
17.1-18.0=36
>18.0 = 44
Foreign Material
<0.5 = 0
0.5-0.7 =.5
0.8-1.0 = 3
1.1-1.3 = 5
1.4-2.0 = 6
2.1-2.5 = 7
2.6-3.0 =8
3.1-3.5 = 9
3.6-4.0 =10
4.1-5.0 = 12
>5.0= 14
Damage
~2.0 =0
2.1-3.0= 1
3.1-4.0=2
4.1-5.0=3
5.1-6.0 = 5
6.1-7.0=7
7.1-8.0 = 9
8.1-9.0 = 11
9.1-10.0 = 13
>10 = 16
Total Defects
<3=0
3.1-4.0 =.5
4.1-5.0 = 1
5.1-6.0 = 3
6.1-7.0 = 5
7.1-8.0 = 7
8.1-9.0 = 9
9.1-10.0 = 11
10.1-11.0 =14
11.1-12.0 =17
12.1-13.0 =20
13.1-14.0 =23
>14 = 26
Source: Farmland Grain Division
99
Appendix Table A 7
Oklahoma Quality Characteristics For Test Weight, Dockage, and SBK
During 1995 Wheat Harvest Showing Three Different
Qualities and Discounts From NIL Buyers
1995
Quality Quality Level (% bu/mi~ Average NIL Discounts (centslbushel)
Test Weight High ~60# =9.6% 60.59 5.5
Middle 57#-59.9 = 59.5% 58.45 9.5
Low <57# = 30.90,10 55.29 15.5
Total Average 57.7 11.5
Dockage High ~ 2.9 = 65.90,10 .85 0
Middle 3.0-4.5 = 5% 3.78 4
Low >4.5 =29.1% 11.21 34
Total Average 4.0 6
SBK High ~ 1.4 =56.8% .81 0
Middle 1.5-1.9 = 13.1% 1.69 .5
Low ~2.0 = 30.1% 3.25 2
Total Average 1.7 .5
Source: Calculated from data in Kenkel, Anderson, and Attaway
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Appendix Table A8
Oklahoma Quality Characteristics For Test Weight, Dockage, and SBK
During 1996 Wheat Harvest Showing Three Different
Qualities and Discounts From NIL Buyers
1996
Quality Quality Level (% bu/mi2) Average (%) Nll.. Discounts (centslbushel)
Test Weight High ~60#= 16.5% 60.81 0
Middle 57#-59.9 = 44.5% 58.52 1
Low <57# = 39.00,/0 55.19 12
Total Average 57.6 2
Dockage High ~ .9 = 64.1% .50 0
Middle 1.0-2.0 = 27.5% 1.37 2
Low >2.0 = 8.4% 3.59 6
Total Average 1.0 2
SBK High ~ 3= 83.6 % 1.51 a
Middle 3.0-3.9 = 10.5% 3.46 .5
Low >4.0 = 5.9",10 4.94 1
Source: Calculated from data in Kenkel, Anderson, and Attaway
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Appendix Table A9
Oklahoma Quality Characteristics For Test Weight. Dockage, and SBK
During 1997 Wheat Harvest Showing Three Different
Qualities and Discounts From NIT.. Buyers
1997
Quality Quality Level (% bu/mi~ Average (%) NIL Discounts (centslbushel)
Test Weight High ~60# = 38.0% 61.35 0
Middle 59#-59.9 = 16.90.10 59.4 .5
Low <59# =45.1% 57.31 4
Total Average 59.2 .5
Dockage High ~ 1.0 = 69.2% .56 0
Middle 1.1-2.0 = 20.3% 1.41 2
Low >2.0 = 10.5% 4.76 7
Total Average 1.2 2
SBK High ~ 3= 95.1% 1.28 0
Middle 3.1-4.0 = 3.7% 3.31 .5
Low >4.1 = 1.2% 5.29 3
Total Average 1.4 0
Source: Calculated from data in Kenkel, Anderson, and Attaway
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Appendix Table A.l0
Production Densities of Oklahoma Districts During 1995 Harvest
Panhandle
West Central
Southwest
North Central
Central
South Central
Northeast
East Central
Southeast'
OVERALL AVERAGE
BushelsITotal Farmland Acre
2.4
5.5
5.8
9.1
3.0
.3
.6
.2
.1
3.4
1,556
3,512
3,708
5,804
1933
208
391
209
54
2,174
Source: Calculated from data in Oklahoma Agricultural Census (1992) and Oklahoma Agricultural Statistics
Service (1995)
Appendix Table A. 11
Production Densities of Oklahoma Districts During 1996 Harvest
Panhandle
West Central
Southwest
North Central
Central
South Central
Northeast
East Central
Southeast
OVERALL AVERAGE
BushelsITotal Farmland Acre
2.1
4.2
5.0
6.9
2.9
.5
1.1
.3
.1
2.9
~ (BulM?)
1,352
2,699
3,213
4,438
1,830
320
686
209
89
1,854
Source: Calculated from data in Oklahoma Agricultural Census (1992) and Oklahoma Agricultural Statistics
Service (1996)
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APPENDIXB
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS RESULTS
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Appendix Table B.l
Sensitivity Analysis: Various Price Differentials
Structure I: Strategy I, Results ofElevator A Maximizing Profits:
No Competition, Elevator A GTades and Segregates (pays Different Quality Prices)
Price Elevator Price Price Price Quantity Quantity Quantity Radius Radius Radius Profit
Differential($) Ql($) Q2($) Q3($) Ql(bu.) Q2(bu.) Q3(bu.) Ql(mi.) Q2(mi.) Q3(mi) ($)
.10 A 4.29 4.22 4.16 17,721,557 95,612,357 42,735,987 161 153 144 94.42M
.08 A 4.28 4.22 4.17 17,356,736 95,612,357 43,728,058 159 153 146 94.94M
.06 A 4.26 4.22 4.18 16,995,708 95,612,357 44,731,513 158 153 148 95.48M
.04 A 4.25 4.22 4.20 16,638,476 95,612,357 45,746,352 156 153 149 96.05M
-0
.02 4.24 4.22 154 151 96.64MVI A 4.21 16,285,037 95,612,357 46,772,574 153
.00 A 4.22 4.22 4.22 15,935,393 95,612,357 47,810,179 IS3 153 153 97.27M
Alternative Value = $3.00
2,174 Production Density (bushels! mi~
10010 High Quality, 60% Middle Quality, 30010 Low Quality
QI-= High Quality
Q2= Middle Quality
Q3= Low Quality
Appendix Table B.2
Sensitivity Analysis: Various Price Differentials
Structure 1: Strategy 2. Results ofElevator A Maximizing Profits:
No Competition, Elevator A Grades and Segregates (pays One Average Price)
Price Elevator Price Price Price Quantity Quantity Quantity Radius Radius Radius Profit
Differential($) QI($) Q2($) Q3($) QI(bu.) Q2 (bu.) Q3 (bu.) QI(mi.) Q2(mi.) Q3 (mi.) ($)
.10 A 4.21 4.21 4.21 15,589.543 93,537,258 46.772.574 151 151 lSI 94.11 M
.08 A 4.21 4.21 4.21 15.658,409 93.950.457 46.979.184 151 151 151 94.74M
.06 A 4.21 4.21 4.21 15.727,428 94.364.566 47.186,250 152 152 152 95.37 M
.04 A 4.22 4.22 4.22 15,7%,598 94.779.586 47.393,771 152 152 152 96.00M
-0
.02 A 4.22 4.22 4.22 15.865,919 95,195.516 47.601.748 152 152 152 96.63 M0\
.00 A 4.22 4.22 4.22 15.935.393 95.612.357 47,810,179 153 153 IS3 97.27 M
Alternative Value = $3.00
2.174 Production Density (bushels! mi2)
10% High Quality, 60% Middle Quality. 300A! Low Quality
Q1= High Quality
Q2= Middle Quality
Q3= Low Quality
Appendix Table B.3
Sensitivity Analysis: Various Price Differentials
Structure I: Strategy 3, Results of Elevator A Maximizing Profits:
No Competition, Elevator A Does Not Gnlde or Segregate (Pays One Average Price)
Price Elevator Price Price Price Quantity Quantity Quantity Radius Radius Radius Profit
Differential ($) QI($) Q2($) Q3($) QI($) Q2(bu.) Q3(bu.) QI(mi.) Q2(mi.) Q3(mi.) ($)
.10 A 4.17 4.17 4.17 14,524,917 87,149,504 43,578,522 146 146 146 84.63 M
.08 A 4.18 4.18 4.18 14,858,815 89,152,889 44,580,269 147 147 147 87.76 M
.06 A 4.19 4.19 4.19 15,196,507 91,179,040 45,593,400 149 149 149 99.06M
.04 A 4.21 4.21 4.21 15,537,993 93,227,957 46,617,915 151 151 151 93.65M
.-
0
.02 A 4.22 4.22 4.22 15,883,273 95,299,641 47,653,813 152 152 152 96.79M~
.00 A 4.23 4.23 4.23 16,232,349 97,394,091 48,701,094 154 154 154 100.00 M
Alternative Value = $3.00
2,174 Production Density (bushels! mil)
10010 High Quality, 600/0 Middle Quality, 30010 Low Quality
Q 1= High Quality
Q2= Middle Quality
Q3= Low Quality
Appendix Table B.4
Sensitivity Analysis: Various Price Differentials
Structure 2: Strategy 1. Results of Elevator A & B Maximizing Profits:
Competition (Elevators A & B Don't Copy Each Other)
Elevator A Grades and Segregates (pays Different Quality Prices)
Elevator B Grades and Segregates (pays One Average Price)
Price Elevator Price Price Price Quantity
Differential($) Q1($) Q2($) Q3($) Q1(bu.)
Quantity
Q2(bu.)
Quantity
Q3(bu.)
Radius Radius Radius
Ql(mi) Q2(mi.) Q3(mi.)
Profit
($)
.10 A 4.81 4.74 4.67 670,845 2,169,147 441,614 31 23 15 209,102
B 4.72 4.72 4.72 51,214 1,183,285 1,314,955 9 17 25 68,976
.08 A 4.80 4.74 4.69 567,899 2,013,971 492,861 29 22 16 174,107
-'
B 4.73 4.73 4.73 85,128 1,302,902 1,230,361 11 18 24 85,403
0
00
.06 A 4.79 4.75 4.71 478,290 1,887,438 555,695 27 22 17 148,679
B 4.74 4.74 4.74 125,155 1,408,378 1,135,950 13 18 23 99,127
.04 A 4.78 4.75 4.72 400,075 1,784,764 630,594 24 21 18 131,389
B 4.74 4.74 4.74 170,439 1,499.746 1.034,616 16 19 22 109.448
.02 A 4.76 4.75 4.74 332,159 1,702,713 718,403 22 20 19 121,340
B 4.75 4.75 4.75 219.984 1,576,810 928,670 18 20 21 115,842
.00 A 4.75 4.75 4.75 273.193 1,639.157 820,169 20 20 20 118,042
B 4.75 4.75 4.75 273,193 1.639,157 820,169 20 20 20 118,042
2,174 Production Density (bushels! mi2)
10% High Quality, 6()OAJ Middle Quality, 30% Low Quality
Q1= High Quality
Q2= Middle Quality
Q3= Low Quality
Appendix Table B.5
Sensitivity Analysis: Various Price Differentials
Structure 2: Strategy 2, Results of Elevator A & B Maximizing Profits:
Competition (Elevators A & B Don't Copy Each Other)
Elevator A Grades and Segregates (pays Different Quality Prices)
Elevator B Does Not Grade or Segregate (pays One Average Price)
Price Elevator Price Price Price Quantity
Differential($) Ql($) Q2($) Q3($) Ql(bu.)
Quantity
Q2(bu.)
Quantity
Q3(bu.)
Radius Radius Radius
Ql(mi.) Q2(mi.) Q3(mi.)
Profit
($)
.10 A 4.80 4.73 4.66 805,271 2,771,376 640,308 34 26 18 343,545
B 4.68 4.68 4.68 21,901 802,541 1,022,241 6 14 22 27,485
.08 A 4.79 4.73 4.68 663,797 2,461,600 652,792 31 25 18 270,130
B 4.70 4.70 4.70 53,185 983,356 1,006,609 9 15 22 45,262
-0
.06 A 4.78 4.74 4.70 537,874 2,179,697 669,050 28 23 18 209,248'.0
B 4.72 4.72 4.72 97,318 1,175,515 986,650 12 17 22 66,646
.04 A 4.77 4.75 4.72 426,545 1,922,007 688,481 25 22 18 159,037
B 4.73 4.73 4.73 153,862 1,378,80~ %3,366 15 18 22 91,902
.02 A 4.77 4.75 4.74 329,125 1,685,943 710,713 22 20 19 118,032
B 4.75 4.75 4.75 222,466 1,593,030 937,458 18 20 21 121,346
.00 A 4.76 4.76 4.76 244,945 1,469,672 735,395 19 19 19 85,010
B 4.77 4.77 4.77 302,982 1,817,889 909,567 21 21 21 155,333
2,174 Production Density (bushels! mi~
l()<l/o High Quality, 60% Middle Quality, 3()<l/o Low Quality
Q 1= High Quality
Q2= Middle Quality
Q3= Low Quality
rAppendix Table B.6
Sensitivity Analysis: Various Price Differentials
Structure 2: Strategy 3, Results ofElevator A & B Maximizing Profits:
Competition (Elevators A & B Don't Copy Each Other)
Elevator A Grades and Segregates (pays One Average Price)
Elevator B Does Not Grade or Segregate (pays One Average Price)
Price Elevator Price Price Price Quantity
Differential($) Ql($) Q2($) Q3($) Ql(bu.)
Quantity
Q2(bu.)
Quantity
Q3(bu.)
Radius Radius Radius
QI(mi.) Q2(mi.) Q3(mi.)
Profit
($)
.10 A 4.72 4.72 4.72 391,357 2,348,140 1,174,771 24 24 24 274,164
B 4.69 4.69 4.69 176,209 1,057,252 529,093 16 16 16 13,254
-
.08 A 4.73 4.73 4.73 359,342 2,156,055 1,078,700 23 23 23 229,146
- B 4.70 4.70 4.70 198,832 1,192,989 596,992 17 17 17 35,7490
.06 A 4.73 4.73 4.73 328,734 1,972,403 986,846 22 22 22 187,866
B 4.72 4.72 4.72 222,788 1,336,726 668,892 18 18 18 61,005
.04 A 4.74 4.74 4.74 299,412 1,796,475 898,853 21 21 21 150,215
B 4.73 4.73 4.73 248,175 1,489,047 745,084 19 19 19 89,291
.02 A 4.75 4.75 4.75 271,497 1,628,985 815,080 20 20 20 115,978
B 4.75 4.75 4.75 274,894 1,649,362 825,272 20 20 20 120,666
.00 A 4.76 4.76 4.76 244,945 1,469,672 735,395 19 19 19 85,010
B 4.77 4.77 4.77 302,982 1,817,889 909,567 21 21 21 155,333
2,174 Production Density (bushels! mi~
10% High Quality, 6Q01o Middle Quality, 30% Low Quality
Q1= High Quality
Q2= Middle Quality
Q3= Low Quality
Appendix Table B.7
Sensitivity Analysis: Various Price Differentials
Structure 3: Strategy I, Results ofElevator A & B Maximizing Profits:
Competition (Elevators A & B Copy Each Other)
Elevators A & B Grade and Segregate (pay Different Quality Prices)
Price Elevator Price Price Price Quantity Quantity Quantity Radius Radius Radius Profit
Differential($) QI($) Q2($) Q3($) Ql(bu.) Q2(bu.) Q3(bu.) QI(mi.) Q2(mi.) Q3(mi.) ($)
.10 A 4.85 4.75 4.65 273,193 1,639,157 820,156 20 20 20 118,032
B 4.85 4.75 4.65 273,193 1,639,157 820,156 20 20 20 118,032
.08 A 4.83 4.75 4.67 273,193 1,639,157 820,156 20 20 20 118,027
B 4.83 4.75 4.67 273,193 1,639,157 820,156 20 20 20 118,027
...... .06 A 4.81 4.75 4.69 273,193 1,639,157 820,156 20 20 20 118,027
......
B 4.81 4.75 4.69 273,193 1,639,157 820,156 20 20 20 118,027......
.04 A 4.79 4.75 4.71 273,193 1,639,157 820,156 20 20 20 118,027
B 4.79 4.75 4.71 273,193 1,639,157 820,156 20 20 20 118,027
.02 A 4.77 4.75 4.73 273,193 1,639,157 820,156 20 20 20 118,028
B 4.77 4.75 4.73 273,193 1,639,157 820,156 20 20 20 118,028
.00 A 4.75 4.75 4.75 273,193 1,639,157 820,156 20 20 20 118,028
B 4.75 4.75 4.75 273,193 1,639,157 820,156 20 20 20 118,028
2,174 Production Density (bushels! mi2)
10% High Quality, 60% Middle Quality, 30010 Low Quality
Q1= High Quality
Q2= Middle QUtllity
Q3= Low Quality
Appendix Table B.8
Sensitivity Analysis: Various Price Differentials
Structw'e 3: Strategy 2, Results ofElevator A & B Maximizing Profits:
Competition (Elevators A & B Copy Each Other)
Elevators A & B Grade and Segregate (pay One Average Price)
Price Elevator Price Price Price Quantity
Ditferential($) QI($) Q2($) Q3($) QI(bu.)
Quantity
Q2(bu.)
Quantity
Q3(bu.)
Radius Radius Radius
QI(mi.) Q2(mi.) Q3(mi.)
Profit
($)
.10 A 4.73 4.73 4.73 273,193 1,639,157 820,156 20 20 20 117,983
B 4.73 4.73 4.73 273,193 1,639,157 820,156 20 20 20 117,983
.08 A 4.74 4.74 4.74 273,193 1,639,157 820,156 20 20 20 117,983
B 4.74 4.74 4.74 273,193 1,639,157 820,156 20 20 20 117,983
.....
.....
.06 A 4.74 4.74 4.74 273,193 1,639,157 820,156 20 20 20 117,983N
B 4.74 4.74 4.74 273,193 1,639,157 820.156 20 20 20 117.983
.04 A 4.74 4.74 4.74 273,193 1,639,157 820,156 20 20 20 117,983
B 4.74 4.74 4.74 273,193 1,639,157 820,156 20 20 20 117,983
.02 A 4.75 4.75 4.75 273,193 1,639,157 820,156 20 20 20 117,983
B 4.75 4.75 4.75 273,193 1,639,157 820,156 20 20 20 117,983
.00 A 4.75 4.75 4.75 273,193 1,639,157 820,156 20 20 20 117,983
B 4.75 4.75 4.75 273,193 1,639,157 820,156 20 20 20 117,983
2,174 Production Density (bushels! mi~
10% High Quality, 60010 Middle Quality, 30% Low Quality
Q 1= High Quality
Q2= Middle Quality
Q3= Low Quality
Appendix Table B.9
Sensitivity Analysis: Various Price Differentials
Structure 3: Strategy 3, Results ofElevator A & B Maximizing Profits:
Competition (Elevators A & B Copy Each Other)
Elevators A & B Do Not Grade or Segregate (pay One Average Price)
Price Elevator Price Price Price Quantity Quantity Quantity Radius Radius Radius Profit
Differential($) Ql($) Q2($) Q3($) Ql(bu.) Q2(bu.) Q3(bu.) QI(mi.) Q2(mi.) Q3(mi.) ($)
.10 A 4.67 4.67 4.67 273,193 1,639,157 820,161 20 20 20 118,639
B 4.67 4.67 4.67 273,193 1,639,157 820,161 20 20 20 118,639
.08 A 4.69 4.69 4.69 273,193 1,639,157 820,161 20 20 20 118,620
B 4.69 4.69 4.69 273,193 1,639,157 820,161 20 20 20 118,620
...... .06 A 4.71 4.71 4.71 273,193 1,639,157 820,161 20 20 20 118,620
.....
B 4.71 4.71 4.71 273,193 1,639,157 820,161 20 20 20 118,620w
.04 A 4.73 4.73 4.73 273,193 1,639,157 820,161 20 20 20 118,620
B 4.73 4.73 4.73 273,193 1,639,157 820,161 20 20 20 118,620
.02 A 4.75 4.75 4.75 273,193 1,639,157 820,161 20 20 20 118,621
B 4.75 4.75 4.75 273,193 1,639,157 820,161 20 20 20 118,621
.00 A 4.77 4.77 4.77 273,193 1,639,157 820,161 20 20 20 118,621
B. 4.77 4.77 4.77 273,193 1,639,157 820,161 20 20 20 118,621
2,174 Production Density (bushels! mil)
10010 High Quality, 60% Middle Quality, 30010 Low Quality
Q1= High QwIlity
Q2= Middle Quality
Q3= Low QwIlity
Appendix Table B.l0
Sensitivity Analysis: Various Production Densities
Structure 1: Strategy 1, Results ofElevator A Maximizing Profits:
No Competition, Elevator A Grades and Segregates (pays Different Quality Prices)
Production Elevator Price Price Price Quantity Quantity Quantity Radius Radius Radius Profit
Densities(bulmi2) Ql(S) Q2($) Q3($) Ql(bu.) Q2(bu.) Q3(bu.) Ql(mi.) Q2(mi.) Q3(mi.) ($)
1,000 A 4.29 4.22 4.16 8,151,590 43,979,925 19,657,768 161 153 144 43.37M
2,174 A 4.29 4.22 4.16 17,721,557 95,612,357 42,735,987 161 153 144 94.42M
-
- 4,000 A 4.29 4.22 4.16 32,606,361 175,919,700 78,631,070 161 153 144 173.82M~
Alternative Value = $3.00
$.10 Price Differential
l00!o High Quality, 60% Middle Quality, 300/0 Low Quality
Q I= High Quality
Q2= Middle Quality
Q3= Low Quality
Appendix Table B.l1
Sensitivity Analysis: Various Production Densities
StructW"e I: Strategy 2, Results ofElevator A Maximizing Profits:
No Competition, Elevator A Grades and Segregates (pays One Average Price)
Production Elevator Price Price Price Quantity Quantity Quantity Radius Radius Radius Profit
Densities(bu/mi2) QI($) Q2($) Q3($) QI(bu.) Q2(bu.) Q3(bu.) Ql(mi.) Q2(mi.) Q3(mi.) ($)
1,000 A 4.21 4.21 4.21 7,170,903 43,025,418 21,514,523 lSI lSI 151 43.24M
2,174 A 4.21 4.21 4.21 15,589,543 93,537,258 46,772,574 151 151 lSI 94.11 M
-
4,000 A 4.21 4.21 4.21 28,683,612 172,101,672 86,058,094 151 151 151 173.32 M
-V\
Alternative Value = $3.00
$.10 Price Differential
10% High Quality, 60% Middle Quality, 30% Low Quality
Q1= High Quality
Q2= Middle Quality
Q3= Low Quality
Appendix Table B.12
Sensitivity Analysis: Various Production Densities
StructW"e 1: Strategy 3, Results ofElevator A Maximizing Profits:
No Competition, Elevator A Does Not Grade or Segregate (pays One Average Price)
Production Elevator Price Price Price Quantity Quantity Quantity Radius Radius Radius Profit
Densities(bu/mP) QI($) Q2($) Q3($) QI(bu.) Q2(bu.) Q3(bu.) Ql(mi.) Q2(mi.) Q3(mi.) ($)
1,000 A 4.17 4.17 4.17 6,681,195 40,087,168 20,045,318 146 146 146 38.87 M
2,174 A 4.17 4.17 4.17 14,524,917 87,149,504 43,578,522 146 146 146 84.63 M
4,000 A 4.17 4.17 4.17 26,724,779 160,348,674 80,181,273 146 146 146 ISS.80M
......
......
0\
Alternative Value = $3.00
$.) 0 Price Differential
10% High Quality, 6Q01o Middle Quality, 30% Low Quality
Q I= High Quality
Q2= Middle Quality
Q3= Low Quality
Appendix Table B.13
Sensitivity Analysis: Various Production Densities
Structure 2: Strategy 1, Results ofElevator A & B Maximizing Profits:
Competition (Elevators A & B Don't Copy Each Other)
Elevator A Grades and Segregates (pays Different Quality Prices)
Elevator B Grades and Segregates (pays One Average Price)
Production Elevator Price Price Price Quantity Quantity Quantity Radius Radius Radius Profit
Densities(bu/mP) QI($) Q2($) Q3($) Ql(bu.) Q2(bu.) Q3(bu.) Ql(mi.) Q2(mi.) Q3(mi.) ($)
1,000 A 4.81 4.74 4.67 308,576 997,768 203,134 31 23 15 41,864
B 4.72 4.72 4.72 23,558 544,289 604,855 9 17 25 -22,591
2,174 A 4.81 4.74 4.67 670,845 2,169,147 441,614 31 23 15 209,102
B 4.72 4.72 4.72 51,214 1,183,285 1,314,955 9 17 25 68,976
.....
.....
-.I
4,000 A 4.81 4.74 4.67 1,234,305 3,991,071 812,537 31 23 15 469,218
B 4.72 4.72 4.72 94,231 2,177,158 2,419,421 9 17 15 211,397
Alternative Value = $3.00
$.10 Price Differential
10% High Quality, 60010 Middle Quality, 30% Low Quality
Q1= High Quality
Q2~ Middle Quality
Q3= Low Quality
Appendix Table B.14
Sensitivity Analysis: Various Production Densities
Structure 2: Strategy 2, Results of Elevator A & B Maximizing Profits:
Competition (Elevators A & B Don't Copy Each Other)
Elevator A Grades and Segregates (pays Different Quality Prices)
Elevator B Does Not Grade or Segregate (pays One Average Price)
Production Elevator Price Price Price Quantity Quantity Quantity Radius Radius Radius Profit
Densities(bu/mi2) Ql($) Q2($) Q3($) Ql(bu.) Q2(bu.) Q3(bu.) Ql(mi.) Q2(mi.) Q3(mi.) ($)
1,000 A 4.80 4.73 4.66 370,410 1,274,782 294,530 34 26 18 103,705
B 4.68 4.68 4.68 10,074 369,154 470,212 6 14 22 -41,359
2,174 A 4.80 4.73 4.66 805,271 2,771,376 640,308 34 26 18 343,545
B 4.68 4.68 4.68 21,901 802,541 1,022,241 6 14 22 27,485
......
......
00
4,000 A 4.80 4.73 4.66 1,481,639 5,099,127 1,178,120 34 26 18 716,583
B 4.68 4.68 4.68 40,295 1,476,617 1,880,848 6 14 22 134,562
Alternative Value = $3.00
$.10 Price Differential
10% High Quality, 60% Middle Quality, 30% Low Quality
Q 1= High Quality
Q2= Middle Quality
Q3= Low Quality
Appendix Table B.15
Sensitivity Analysis: Various Production Densities
Structure 2: Strategy 3, Results of Elevator A & B Maximizing Profits:
Competition (Elevators A & B Don't Copy Each Other)
Elevator A Grades and Segregates (Pays One Average Price)
Elevator B Does Not Grade or Segregate (pays One Average Price)
Production Elevator Price Price Price Quantity Quantity Quantity Radius Radius Radius Profit
Densities(bu/mi2) Ql($) Q2($) Q3($) QI(bu.) Q2(bu.) Q3(bu.) Ql(mi.) Q2(mi.) Q3(mi.) ($)
1,000 A 4.72 4.72 4.72 180,017 1,080,101 540,373 24 24 24 71,792
B 4.69 4.69 4.69 81,053 486,316 243,373 16 16 16 47,905
2,174 A 4.72 4.72 4.72 391,357 2,348,140 1,174,771 24 24 24 274,164
B 4.69 4.69 4.69 176,209 1,057,252 529,093 16 16 16 13,254
....
....
\0
4,000 A 4.72 4.72 4.72 720,067 4,320,405 2,161,491 24 24 24 588,928
B 4.69 4.69 4.69 324,211 1,945,265 973,492 16 16 16 108,379
Alternative Value = $3.00
$.10 Price Differential
10% High Quality, 60% Middle Quality, 30010 Low Quality
QI= High Quality
Q2= Middle Quality
Q3= Low Quality
Appendix Table B.16
Sensitivity Analysis: VmollS Production Densities
Structw"e 3: Strategy I, Results of Elevator A & B Maximizing Profits:
Competition (Elevators A & B Copy Each Other)
Elevators A & B Grade and Segregate (Pay Different Quality Prices)
Production Elevator Price Price Price Quantity Quantity Quantity Radius Radius Radius Profit
Densities(bulmi') QI($) Q2($) Q3($) Ql(bu.) Q2(bu.) Q3(bu.) Ql(mi.) Q2(mi.) Q3(mi.) ($)
1,000 A 4.85 4.75 4.65 125,664 753,982 377).57 20 20 20 -26
B 4.85 4.75 4.65 125,664 753,982 377,257 20 20 20 -26
2,174 A 4.85 4.75 4.65 273,193 1,639,157 820,156 20 20 20 118,032
B 4.85 4.75 4.65 273,193 1,639,157 820,156 20 20 20 118,032
-N 4,000 A 4.85 4.75 4.65 502,655 3,015,929 1,509,027 20 20 20 301,6560
B 4.85 4.75 4.65 502,655 3,015,929 1,509,027 20 20 20 301,656
Alternative Value - $3.00
$.10 Pri.ce Differential
10% High Quality, 6QO,4 Middle Quality, 30% Low Quality
Q1= High Quality
Q2= Middle Quality
Q3= Low Quality
Appendix Table B.17
Sensitivity Analysis: Various Production Densities
Structure 3: Strategy 2, Results ofElevator A & B Maximizing Profits:
Competition (Elevators A & B Copy Each Other)
Elevators A & B Grade and Segregate (pay One Average Price)
Production Elevator Price Price Price Quantity Quantity Quantity Radius Radius Radius Profit
Densities(bulmi2) Ql($) Q2($) Q3($) Ql(bu.) Q2(bu.) Q3(bu.) Ql(mi.) Q2(mi.) Q3(mi.) ($)
1,000 A 4.73 4.73 4.73 125,664 753,982 377,261 20 20 20 -49
B 4.73 4.73 4.73 125,664 753,982 377,261 20 20 20 -49
2,174 A 4.73 4.73 4.73 273,193 1,639,157 820,166 20 20 20 117,983
B 4.73 4.73 4.73 273,193 1,639,157 820,166 20 20 20 117,983
.....
tv 4,000 A 4.73 4.73 4.73 502,655 3,015,929 1,509,045 20 20 20 301,566
.....
B 4.73 4.73 4.73 502,655 3,015,929 1,509,045 20 20 20 301,566
Alternative Value = $3.00
$.10 Price Differential
10% High Quality, 6Q01o Middle Quality, 30% Low Quality
Ql= High Quality
Q2= Middle Quality
Q3= Low Quality
Appendix Table 8.18
Sensitivity Analysis: Various Production Densities
Structure 3: Strategy 3, Results ofElevator A & B Maximizing Profits:
Competition (Elevators A & B Copy Each Other)
Elevators A & B Do Not Grade or Segregate (pay One Average Price)
Production Elevator Price Price Price Quantity Quantity Quantity Radius Radius Radius Profit
Densities(bu/mi2) QI($) Q2($) Q3($) Q](bu.) Q2(bu.) Q3(bu.) Q](mi.) Q2(mi.) Q3(mi.) ($)
1,000 A 4.67 4.67 4.67 ]25,664 753,982 377,258 20 20 20 570
B 4.67 4.67 4.67 125,664 753,982 377,258 20 20 20 570
2,174 A 4.67 4.67 4.67 273,193 1,639,157 820,158 20 20 20 118,639
B 4.67 4.67 4.67 273,193 1,639,]57 820,]58 20 20 20 118,639
......
tv 4,000 A 4.67 4.67 4.67 502,655 3,015,929 1,509,031 20 20 20 302,279tv
B 4.67 4.67 4.67 502,655 3,015,929 1,509,031 20 20 20 302,279
Alternative Value =$3.00
$.10 Price Differential
10% High Quality, 60010 Middle Quality, 30% Low Quality
Q I=High Quality
Q2= Middle Quality
Q3= Low Quality
Appendix Table B.19
Sensitivity Analysis: Various Quality Levels
Structure 1: Strategy I, Results ofElevator A Maximizing Profits:
No Competition, Elevator A GTades and Segregates (pays Different Quality Prices)
Quality Elevator Price Price Price Quantity Quantity Quantity Radius Radius Radius Profit
Levels(%) Ql($) Q2($) Q3($) QI(bu.) Q2(bu.) Q3(bu.) Ql(mi.) Q2(mi.) Q3(mi.) ($)
10% QI A 4.29 4.22 4.16 17,721,557 95,612,357 42,735,987 161 153 144 94.42M
6()01o Q2
30% Q3
30% Ql A 4.29 4.22 4.16 53,164,671 63,741,571 42,735,987 161 153 144 97.79M
40%Q2
30%Q3
......
tv 50%Ql A 4.29 4.22 4.16 88,607,785 31,870,786 42,735,981 161 153 144 101.15 Mw
20%Q2
30%Q3
Alternative Value = $3.00
2,174 Production Density (bushels! mi2)
$.10 Price Differential
Q 1= High Quality
Q2'" Middle Quality
Q3= Low Quality
~~------
Appendix Table B.20
Sensitivity Analysis: Various Quality Levels
Structure 1: Strategy 2, Results ofElevator A Maximizing Profits:
No Competition, Elevator A Grades and Segregates (pays One Average Price)
Quality Elevator Price Price Price Quantity Quantity Quantity Radius Radius Radius Profit
Levels(%) QI($) Q2($) Q3($) Ql(bu.) Q2(bu.) Q3(bu.) Ql(mi.) Q2(mi.) Q3(mi.) ($)
100/0 Q1 A 4.21 4.21 4.21 15,589,543 93,537,258 46,772,574 151 151 151 94.11 M
600/0 Q2
300/0 Q3
300/0 Q1 A 4.22 4.22 4.22 47,806,179 63,741,571 47,810,179 153 153 153 97.27M
400/0 Q2
300/0 Q3
-tv 50%Q1 A 4.24 4.24 4.24 81,425,185 32,570,074 48,859,168 154 154 154 100.49 M~
200/0 Q2
300/0 Q3
Alternative Value =$3.00
2,174 Production Density (bushels! mi2)
$.10 Price Differential
Q1=High Quality
Q2= Middle Quality
Q3= Low Quality
Appendix Table B.21
Sensitivity Analysis: Various Quality Levels
Structure I: Strategy 3, Results ofElevator A Maximizing Profits:
No Competition, Elevator A Does Not Grade or Segregate (pays One Average Price)
Quality Elevator Price Price Price Quantity Quantity Quantity Radius Radius Radius Profit
Levels(%) Ql(S) Q2($) Q3($) QI(bu.) Q2(bu.) Q3(bu.) Ql(mi.) Q2(mi.) Q3(mi.) ($)
10% Ql A 4.17 4.17 4.17 14,524,917 87,149,504 43,578,522 146 146 146 84.63 M
60% Q2
30% Q3
30010 QI A 4.23 4.23 4.23 48,697,045 64,929,394 48,701,094 154 154 154 lOO.OOM
400/0 Q2
30%Q3
-N 50%QI A 4.23 4.23 4.23 81,161,743 32,464,697 48,701,094 154 154 154 loo.OOMVl
20%Q2
30%Q3
Alternative Value = $3.00
2,174 Production Density (bushels! mi2)
$.10 Price Differential
Q I= High Quality
Q2=.Middle Quality
Q3= Low Quality
Appendix Table B.22
Sensitivity Analysis: Various Quality Levels
Structure 2: Strategy 1, Results of Elevator A & B Maximizing Profits:
Competition (Elevators A & B Don't Copy Each Other)
Elevator A Grades and Segregates (pays Different Quality Prices)
Elevator B Grades and Segregates (pays One Average Price)
Quality Elevator Price Price Price Quantity Quantity Quantity Radius Radius Radius Profit
Levels(%) QI($) Q2($) Q3($) QI(bu.) Q2(bu.) Q3(bu.) Q1(mi.) Q2(mi.) Q3(mi.) ($)
10010 Ql A 4.81 4.74 4.67 670,845 2,169,147 441,614 31 23 15 209,102
60%Q2 B 4.72 4.72 4.72 51,214 1,183,285 1,314,955 9 17 25 68,976
30010 Q3
30010 QI A 4.81 4.74 4.68 1,930,642 1,366,243 403,707 31 22 14 281,392
..... 40010 Q2 B 4.72 4.72 4.72 177,356 849,808 1,382,686 9 18 26 39.973
tv 30010 Q30\
50010 Q1 A 4.81 4.75 4.68 3,031,586 629,177 353,542 30 21 13 333,365
20010 Q2 B 4.74 4.74 4.74 355,627 469,433 1,480,269 10 19 27 11,780
30010 Q3
Alternative Value =$3.00
2,174 Production Density (bushels! mil)
$. 10 Price Differential
Q I= High Quality
Q2= Middle Quality
Q3= Low Quality
Appendix Table B.23
Sensitivity Analysis: Various Quality Levels
Structure 2: Strategy 2, Results ofElevator A & B Maximizing Profits:
Competition (Elevators A & B Don't Copy Each Other)
Elevator A Grades and Segregates (pays Different Quality Prices)
Elevator B Does Not Grade or Segregate (pays One Average Price)
Quality Elevator Price Price Price Quantity Quantity Quantity Radius Radius Radius Profit
Levels(%) QI($) Q2($) Q3($) Ql(bu.) Q2(bu.) Q3(bu) Ql(mi.) Q2(mi.) Q3(mi.) ($)
10010 Ql A 4.80 4.73 4.66 805,271 2,771,376 640,308 34 26 18 343,545
60010 Q2 B 4.68 4.68 4.68 21,901 802,541 1,022,241 6 14 22 27,485
30010 Q3
30%QI A 4.80 4.73 4.66 2,405,156 1,836,596 634,821 34 26 18 464,256
40010 Q2 B 4.68 4.68 4.68 67,473 540,965 1,029,201 6 14 22 11,563
N 30010 Q3-...J
50010 QI A 4.80 4.73 4.66 3,984,700 911,069 627,467 34 26 17 581,975
20010 Q2 B 4.68 4.68 4.68 116,498 274,428 1,038,614 6 14 23 -4,376
30%Q3
Alternative Value = $3.00
2,174 Production Density (bushels! mi2)
$.10 Price Differential
Q I= High Quality
Q2= Middle Quality
Q3= Low Quality
Appendix Table B.24
Sensitivity Analysis: Various Quality Levels
Structure 2: Strategy 3, Results ofElevator A & B Maximizing Profits:
Competition (Elevators A & B Don't Copy Each Other)
Elevator A Grades and Segregates (pays One Average Price)
Elevator B Does Not Grade or Segregate (pays One Average Price)
Quality Elevator Price Price Price Quantity Quantity Quantity Radius Radius Radius Profit
Levels(%) QI($) Q2($) Q3($) QI(bu.) Q2(bu.) Q3(bu.) Ql(mi.) Q2(mi.) Q3(mi.) ($)
10% QI A 4.72 4.72 4.72 391,357 2,348,140 1,174,771 24 24 24 274,164
60010 Q2 B 4.69 4.69 4.69 176,209 1,057,252 529,093 16 16 16 13,254
30010 Q3
30010 QI A 4.76 4.76 4.76 734,839 979,786 735,398 19 19 19 84,956
-
40010 Q2 B 4.77 4.77 4.77 908,941 1,211,921 909,564 21 21 21 155,334
tv 30%Q300
50010 QI A 4.77 4.77 4.77 1,391,915 556,766 835,747 20 20 20 124.155
20010 Q2 B 4.77 4.77 4.77 1,340,258 536,103 804,741 20 20 20 112,484
30%Q3
Alternative Value =$3.00
2,174 Production Density (bushels! me)
$. 10 Price Differential
Q I=High Quality
Q2= Middle Quality
Q3= Low Quality
Appendix Table 8.25
Sensitivity Analysis: Various Quality Levels
Structure 3: Strategy I, Results ofElevator A & B Maximizing Profits:
Competition (Elevators A & B Copy Each Other)
Elevators A & B Grade and Segregate (pay Different Quality Prices)
Quality Elevator Price Price Price Quantity Quantity Quantity Radius Radius Radius Profit
Leveis(%) Ql($) Q2($) Q3($) Ql(bu.) Q2(bu.) Q3(bu.) Ql(mi.) Q2(mi.) Q3(mi.) ($)
10% Ql A 4.85 4.75 4.65 273,193 1,639,157 820,156 20 20 20 118,032
60% Q2 B 4.85 4.75 4.65 273,193 1,639,157 820,156 20 20 20 118,032
30% Q3
30%QI A 4.85 4.75 4.65 819,579 1,092,772 820,156 20 20 20 118,033
40%Q2 B 4.85 4.75 4.65 819,579 1,092,772 820,156 20 20 20 118,033
..... 30% Q3.
tv
\0
50%Ql A 4.85 4.75 4.65 1,365,%4 546,386 820,169 20 20 20 118,035
20010 Q2 B 4.85 4.75 4.65 1,365,%4 546,386 820,169 20 20 20 118,035
30010 Q3
Alternative Value = $3.00
2,174 Production Density (bushels! mi2)
S.10 Price Differential
Ql= High Quality
Q2= Middle Quality
Q3= Low Quality
~--------
Appendix Table B.26
Sensitivity Analysis: Various Quality Levels
Structure 3: Strategy 2, Results ofElevator A & B Maximizing Profits:
Competition (Elevators A & B Copy Each Other)
Elevators A & B Grade and Segregate (pay One Average Price)
Quality Elevator Price Price Price Quantity Quantity Quantity Radius Radius Radius Profit
Levels(%) Ql($) Q2($) Q3($) Ql(bu.) Q2(bu.) Q3(bu.) Ql(mi.) Q2(mi.) Q3(mi.) ($)
10010 QI A 4.73 4.73 4.73 273,193 1,639,157 820,166 20 20 20 117,983
6Q01o Q2 B 4.73 4.73 4.73 273,193 1,639,157 820,166 20 20 20 117,983
30010 Q3
300/0QI A 4.75 4.75 4.75 819,579 1,092,772 820,169 20 20 20 117,973
40010 Q2 B 4.75 4.75 4.75 819,579 1,092,772 820,169 20 20 20 117,973
...... 30010 Q3
w
0
50010 Ql A 4.77 4.77 4.77 1,365,964 546,386 820,171 20 20 20 117,963
200/0Q2 B 4.77 4.77 4.77 1,365,964 546,386 820,171 20 20 20 117,963
30010 Q3
Alternative Value =S3.00
2,174 Production Density (bushels! mil)
S.IO Price Differential
Q I= High Quality
Q2= Middle Quality
Q3= Low Quality
Appendix Table B.27
Sensitivity Analysis: Various Quality Levels
Structure 3: Strategy 3, Results of Elevator A & B Maximizing Profits:
Competition (Elevators A & B Copy Each Other)
Elevators A & B Do Not Grade or segregate (pay One Average Price)
Quality Elevator Price Price Price Quantity Quantity Quantity Radius Radius Radius Profit
Levels(%) QI($) Q2($) Q3($) Ql(bu.) Q2(bu.) Q3(bu.) Ql(mi.) Q2(mi.) Q3(mi.) ($)
10% Ql A 4.67 4.67 4.67 273,193 1,639,157 820,158 20 20 20 118,639
6O%Q2 B 4.67 4.67 4.67 273,193 1,639,157 820,158 20 20 20 118,639
30%Q3
30%QI A 4.77 4.77 4.77 819,579 1,092,772 820,161 20 20 20 118,621
40010 Q2 B 4.77 4.77 4.77 819,579 1,092,772 820,161 20 20 20 118,621
...... 300/0 Q3
w
......
50%Ql A 4.77 4.77 4.77 1,365,964 546,386 820,171 20 20 20 118,621
20%Q2 B 4.77 4.77 4.77 1,365,964 546,386 820,171 20 20 20 118,621
30%Q3
Alternative Value =$3.00
2, L74 Production Density (bushels! mil)
$.10 Price Differential
Q1=High Quality
Q2= Middle Quality
Q3= Low Quality
APPENDIXC
GAUSS PROGRAM FOR SIMULATION
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GAUSS PROGRAM FOR SIMULAnON SOLVING ELEVATOR PROFITS FOR lHREE DIFFERENT
COMPETITIVE STRUCTURES
/..............•.........••..........................•........................
•• GAUSS program c:\projects\grades\PROFlTEL.GAU
1bis program nwnerically calculates a continuous, rather than integer,
solution using the Constrained Optimization routine
............................................................................../
ne~
ts=hsec;
outwidth 120;
let vnames =meanret stdret defyay fut_opt utilI uti12 util3
ceI ce2 ce3 beta fut putI put2 puG
calli cal12 call3 target Gyart strat;
fonnat Ird 8,3;
disable;
screen on;
output file = c:\projects\grades\ncrI3497\profitel.out reset;
/.
output file = c:\windows\desktop\mybrie-l \profitel.out reset;
./
/.
output file =p:\elliott\profitel.out reset;
./
output on;
beg_date = datesrr(O);
beS_time =timestr(O);
print" "..
print" BEGIN_DATE:";;
print beg_date;
print" "..
print" BEGIN_TIME:";;
print beg_time;
print;
/*
output off;
screen off;
./
/* declaring variables ./
declare
pNIL I,pNIL2,pNIL3,pfarm,pfann1,pfarm2,pfarm3,proddenI,prodden2,altprice,
transport,varcost,fixcost,QUANTITY,radius,radiusa,discount,ii,profblnd.,
radiusb,prof,profa,profb,OPTA,OPTBJmnA)irmB,grade,bgrade,swnQ,blend;
library optmum,quantal,pgraph,co;
#include optmwn.ext;
#include co.ext;
optset;
graphset;
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COset;
nvars =10; '* # ofvariables allowed to affect price paid to farmers .,
1* density ofproduction of quality characteristic i,
prices paid by NIL buyers, transport rate, alternative price,
variable costs, fixed costs .,
nvals = 10; '* # of possible values for exogenous variables */
qchars = 3; /. number of quality grades ./
pfann = ones(qchars,I);
start = pfann • 4.79;
estim I a =start;
estim2a = start;
/.
start[3] =0;
*/
/* exogenous variables .,
distance = 40; /. distance from elevator to competing elevators ./
print "There are ";; print distance;; print "miles between elevators.";
discoWlt = 0.10; /. discoWlt from one grade to the next ./
transport = ones(qchars, 1)*.004;
/. transport cost from farm
to country elevator, $/bulrni .00108·'
compete = I; /* I ifflffil A bas competition fi"om fum B, or else 0 */
gradeA = ); '* does elevator A grade wheat? yes=1,n0=0 */
gradeB = 0; /. does elevator B grade wheat? yes=),no=O -/
onepricA = 1; /* I if elevator A pays one price for all qualities ./
onepricB = 1; /. 1 if elevator B pays one price for aU qualities */
if (gradeb eq 1);
print "firm B grades";
elseif (gradeb eq 0);
print "firm B does not grade";
onepricB = 1;
endif;
if (gradea eq ));
print "firm A grades";
elseif gradea eq 0;
print "firm A does not grade";
onepricA = );
endif;
if onepricA eq l;
print "fum A pays one price for all qualities";
elseifonepricA eq 0;
print "firm A pays different prices for each quality";
endif;
if onepricB eq 1;
print "firm B pays one price for all qualities";
elseifonepricB eq 0;
print "fum B pays different prices for each quality";
endif;
varcosta = ones(qchars,) )·.05;
/. variable cost, $/bu. */
varcostb = varcosta;
/·variable costs includes (depending on grading or not) cost of grading)-'
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varcosta[l] = .05+(gradea·.017);
varcosta[2] =.05+(gradea·.017);
varcosta[3] =.05+(gradea·.O17);
varcostb[l] = .05+(gradeb·.017);
varcostb[2] =.05+(gradeb·.017);
varcostb[3] =.05+(grBdeb·.017);
let proddens[3,3] = .1 .6 .3,
.3.4.3,
.5.2.3;
1*
,............. 1995 test weight values ,
print "1995 test weight values for production density";
procUlen[l] = .096·prod_den[1];
prod_den[2] = .595·prod_den[2];
prod_den[3] =.309.prod_den[3];
print prod_~
,.........................•..........................•.•......,
.,
i = 2;
do until i gt 2; ,. rows(proddens); .,
let product = 1000,2174,4000; 1* 2174 is 1995 average·'
ii =2;
do until ii gt 2; ,. rows(product); .,
print "production density is ";; print product[ii};
prod_den =proddens{i•.]'.·product[ii];
,. production density, bulsquare mile·'
print "prod_den = ";; print prod_den;
pNll.. = ones(qchars,1);
zero = zeros(qchars,1);
altprice =ones(qchars,l);
1* alternative market price for wheat,
e.g. for cattle feed .,
altprice[1] = 3.00;
altprice[2] = 3.00;
altprice[3] = 3.00;
comprice = 4.59; ,. price at competing elevators .,
comprice = comprice·ones(qchars,l );
,. fixcost includes a yearly cost ofowning a grading machine .,
fixcosta =lOOOOO+(gradea·S87); ,. dollars .,
fixcostb =lOOOOO+(grad.eb·S87);
,.
print "varcosta = ";; print varcosta;
print "varcostb = ";; print varcostb;
print "fixcosta = ";; print fixcosta;
print "fixcostb =";; print fixcostb;
.,
capacity =3OOOOOOOOO; 1* bushels merchandised per year ./
/ /
proc elprofit(pt);
local O-AVAll..,cbeck.relyrice,pfgtO,pff,yyy,sumQ,ycap,
zeroQ,compmet;
ifcompete eq 0;
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comprice =0;
endif~
compmet =maxc(altprice'l(comprice-transport·distance)');
relyrice = (pf-compmet) .ge 0.0; ~ relevant prices ./
radius = (pf-compmet).I(2·transport);
Q.AVAll.. = pro'Ulen.·(pi.·
(relyrice.·(radius."2)));
~ positive quantities ./
t- from (pf - (transport ratelmi)*radius ofcircle =
altprice
---> radius = (pf - altprice)/transport ratelmi.) ·1
yyy= 1;
check = 1;
QUANTITY = Q.AVAIL;
I·····················································capacity constraint •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
····················································1
swnQ = sumC{QUANTITy);
if sumQ gt capacity,
QUANTITY = QUANTITY.· (l-«swnQ-<:apacity)/sumQ));
endif;
sumQ =sumc(QUANTITY);
blend = (QUANTITY[1]lsurnQ)·1 + (QUANTITY[2]1sumQ)·2 +
(QUANTITY[3 ]/sumQ)·3;
ifblend ge 2.1 ;
bgrade = 3;
e1seifblend ge 1.1;
bgrade = 2;
e1seif blend It 1.1;
bgrade= 1;
endif;
profblnd = -«(pNIL[bgradeJ·swnQ • sumc(pf.·QUANT1TY))
- sumc«varcosta·firmA+varcostb·firmB).• QUANTITY)
- fixcosta·firmA-fixcostb·fumB));
prof= -(sumc«pNn..· pt).• (QUANTITY)
- (varcosta·finnA+varcostb·finnB). • QUANTITY)
- fixcosta·firmA.fixcostb·firmB);
if«finnB eq 1) and (gradeb eq 0))
or «firmA eq I) and (gradea eq 0));
prof=profblnd;
endif;
if (profblnd gt prof);
prof=profblnd;
endif;
I· positive for graphing,
negative for optimization ./
retp(prof);
endp;
I····················································· /
t- To print out the results •••••••••••••••••••••···············1
let top1[1,9J =
wdiscwwprl A W ·pr2 A· wpr3 A W ·profA·
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j.
*j
/.
"prl B" "pr2 B" "pr3 B" "profB"~
let top2[l,7] =
"disc" "radl A" "rad2 A" "rad3 A" "radl S""rad2 S" "rad3 B";
lettop3[I,7] =
"disc" "Ql A" "Q2 N "Q3 A" "QI B" "Q2 B" "Q3 B";
tabl =ones(6,cols(topl»;
tab2 =ones(6,ools(top2»~
tab3 = ones(6.ools(top3»~
xxx = ones(qchars,l )~
yyy =ones(qchars,I)~
discount = .10;
tabrows = 1;
pNIL[2] = 4.90;
do until discount It ..().01O~
pNIL[l] = pNIL[2] + discount;
pNIL[3] = pNIL[2] - discount;
ubound =.OOOOOI.·ones(qchars,l);
estimla = 4.69.·ones(qchars,l)~
estimIb = 4.69.·ones(qchars,l);
estim2B = 4.29.•ones(qchars,I);
estim2b =4.29.·ones(qchars,l);
xxx = abs(estimlB - estim2a)~
yyy = abs(estim1b - estim2b);
do until «xxx Ie uboUlld) and (yyy le ubound»;
print "xxx =";~ print xxx;
print "yyy = ";; print yyy;
if (compete eq 0);
yyy =ubound;
endif;
cOSet;
_co_A = zeros(3,3);
/ /
/.. Optimization for first elevator, A /
/ •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••j
print "Optimizing A·~
finnA= 1;
fumB=O;
if (onepricA eq I);
/. These constraints set the prices
for each quality to be equal .j
_coj. = { 1 -I 0, 0 1 -1, 1 0 -1 L
_oo_S = zero;
endif;
_co_Bounds = {O 5,
05,
o5 }~
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./
/.
./
/.
./
/.
./
print "comprice = "~; print comprice~
start = estim1a;
print "start = ";~ print start;
{ estimJ_value,grad_vec,retcode } =CO(&elprofit,start);
QUANTA = QUANITTY;
radiusa = radius;
profa =prof;
call coprt(estim,f_valiue,grad_vec,retcode);
print;
print "Equality Lagrangeans";
print vreadl.co_Lagrange,"nlineq"); print;
print "Inequality Lagrangeans";
print vreadl.co_Lagrange,"nlinineq"); print;
print "bOlmdary Lagrangeans·~
print vreadl.co_Lagrange."bounds"); print;
estim2a = estim1a;
estimla = estim;
comprice = estim;
xxx =abs(estimla - estim2a);
ifcompete eq 1~ /. nm this section only ifA has competitor B ./
/ /
/.. Optimization for second elevator, B ••••••••••••••••••••/
/ /
cOSet;
print 'Optimizing B";
finnA= 0;
firmB = I;
/. These constraints set the prices for each quality to be equal ./
if (onepricB eq I);
_co-:.A ={ 1 - I 0, 0 1 -1, 1 0 -1 };
_co_B = zero;
endif;
_co_Options = { dfp halfforward screen };
_co_Bounds ={0 5,
05.
05 };
start =estim1b;
{estimJ_value,grad_vec,retcode} =CO(&elprofit,start);
QUANTE = QUANITTY;
profb = prof,
138
,.
.,
'*
*/
radiusb = radiJus;
call coprt(estimJ_value,grad_vec,retcode);
print;
print ~Equality Lagrangeans~;
print vreadCco_Lagrange,"nlineq"); print;
print "Inequality Lagrangeans";
print vreadl.co_Lagrange,"nlinineq"); print;
print "boundary Lagrangeans";
print vreadl.co_Lagrange,"bounds"); print;
estim2b =esti.m Ib;
estim.l b = estim;
yyy = sbs(estim2b - estimlb);
comprice = estim;
print "compriceb =";; print comprice;
print "profs = ";; print -profa;
print "profb =";; print -protb;
print "pfa = ";; print estimla;
print "pfb =";; print estim Ib;
print "radiusa = ";; print radiusa;
print "radiusb = ";; print radiusb;
print "QUANTITYA = ";; print QUANTA;
print "QUANTITYB =";; print QUANTB;
endif;
endo;
tab I [tabrows,1J = discount;
tabl [tabrows,2] =estimla[ I];
tab1[tabrows,3] =estimla[2];
tab1[tabrows,4] =estimla[3];
tab I [tabrows,sJ =-profs;
ifcompete eq I;
tabl [tabrows,6] = estiml bel];
tab I [tabrows,7] = estimlb[2];
tab I [tabrows,8] = estiml b[3];
tab I [tabrows,9J = -protb;
endif;
tab2[tabrows,l] = discount;
tab2[tabrows,2] = radiusa[]];
tab2[tabrows,3] = radiusa[2];
tab2[tabrows,4] = radiusa[3];
ifcompete eq l;
tab2[tabrows,5] = radiusb[1J;
tab2 [tabrows,6] =radiusb[2];
tab2(tabrows,7] =radiusb[3]:;
endif;
tab3[tabrows,ll = discount;
tab3[tabrows,2] =QUANTA[IJ;
tab3[tabrows,3] =QUANTA[2];
tab3[tabrows,4] =QUANTA[3];
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ifcompete eq 1~
tab3[tabrows,5] = QUANTB[I];
tab3[tabrows,6] = QUANTB[2];
tab3[tabrows,7] = QUANTB[3];
endif;
tabrows =tabrows + 1;
discount = discoWlt - .02;
endo;
print 'production = ';; print product[ii];;
print 'bushels per square mile';
print;
mask1 = zeros(l,cols(top1));
let fintI [9,3} =
··.·s· 88
··.·s· 88
··.·s· 88
··.·s· 88
··.·s· 88
··.·s· 88
··.·s· 88
··.·s· 88
··.·s· 8 8~
r = printfm(top1,mask1,fintl);
print;
mask1 = ones(rows(tab I),co1s(top1));
let fint1 [9,3] =
' •.•if" 8 2
•••if" 8 2
••. *Ir 82
••.•If' 82
••.•If' 80
••.*If" 82
••.•If' 82
••.•If' 82
••.•If' 80;
r =printfm(tabl ,mask I,fintl);
print;
mask2 =zeros(1,cols(top2));
let fint2[7,3] =
··.·s· 10 10
··.·s· 10 10
··.·s· 10 10
··.·s· 10 10
··.·s· 10 10
··.·s· 10 10
··.·s· 10 10;
r = printfm(top2,mask2,fint2);
print;
mask2 = ones(rows(tab2),cols(top2));
let fint2[7,3] =
••.•If' 102
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••.•If' 100
••.•If' 100
••.•If' 100
••.•If' 10 0
••.•If' 10 0
••.•If' 100~
r = printfm(tab2,mask2Jmt2);
print;
mask3 = zeros(l,cols(top3));
let fintJ [7,3] =
··.·s· 10 10
··.·s· 10 10
"·.·s· 1010
"·.·s· 1010
"·.·s· 10 10
··.·s· 10 10
··.·s· 1010;
r =printfrn(top3,mask3JmtJ)~
print;
mask3 = ones(rows(tab3),cols(top3));
let fintJ [7,3] =
•••If' to 2
••.•If' 10 0
••.•If' 100
••.•If' 100
••.•If' 10 a
••.•If' 10 a
••.•If' 10 0;
r = printfrn(tab3,mask3,fintJ);
ii = ii + 1;
endo~
i=i+l~
endo;
graph.set;
xx =tab 1(.,1];
yy = tabl [.,2:4]-tabl[.,6:8];
if (compete eq 1) and (gradeA eq 1) and (gradeB eq 1) and
(onepricA eq 0) and (onepricB eq 0);
title(·Elevator Prices vs. Buyer Prem/Disc\LA & B Grading·);
elseif (compete eq 1) and (gradeA eq 1) and (gradeB eq 1) and (onepricB eq 1)
and (onepricA eq 0);
title(·Elevator Prices vs. Buyer PremlDisc\LA & B Grading, B One Price·);
elseif (compete eq 1) and (gradeA eq 1) and (gradeB eq 1) and (onepricA eq l)
and (onepricB eq 1);
title(·Elevator Prices vs. Buyer PremlDisc\LA & B Grading, Both Pay One Price·);
elseif (compete eq 1) and (gradeA eq 1) and (onepricA eq 1) and (gradeB eq 0);
title(·Elevator Prices vs. NIL Buyer PremlDisc\LOnly A Grades, A One Price·);
elseif (compete eq 1) and (gradeA eq l) and (onepricA eq 0) and (gradeB eq 0);
title(·Elevator Prices vs. NIL Buyer PremlDisc\LOnly A Grades·);
elseif (compete eq 0) and (onepricA eq O)~
title("Elevator Prices vs. NIL Buyer PremlDisc\LA is Monopsony")~
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elseif (compete eq 0) and (onepricA eq 1);
title("Elevator Prices vs. NIL Buyer Prem/Disc\LA is Monopsony, A One Price");
endif;
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